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1.1 New stylized facts of growth and distribution 
A central question of economics has been: how do we explain the distribution 
of income among factors of production, and the distribution of income and 
wealth among individuals. 
Some fifty years ago1 theorists tried to develop explanations for what were 
then viewed to be the stylized facts of growth and distribution, articulated, for 
instance, by Nicholas Kaldor.2 Among the central facts was the constancy of the 
capital-output ratio and the relative shares. 
Today, there seems to be a new set of stylized facts that have to be explained, 
many of them markedly different from those that were the center of attention 
a half century ago.3 Among the empirical observations are the following (some 
of these 11facts 11 are truer for some countries than others; and there are a few 
country exceptions):4 
(a) Growing inequality in both wages and capital income (wealth), and 
growing inequality overall.5 
(b) Wealth is more unequally distributed than wages. 
( c) Average wages have stagnated1 even as productivity has increased, so the 
share of Capital has increased.6 
( d) Significant increases in the wealth-income ratio.7 
( e) The return to capital has not declined, even as wealth-income ratio has 
increased. 
The new stylized facts put a new light on Kuznets' hypothesis8 that, while 
in earlier stages of development, inequality would grow, eventually inequal-
ity would fall. While that may have been true in the golden age of capitalism, 
between the end of World War II and around 1980, the period in which 
Kuznets was writing, such a conclusion no longer seems warranted. 
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In particular, Piketty (2014) has presented data showing that the decades 
following World War II were an historical anomaly, the one period in which 
capitalism was not characterized by a high level of inequality. He argues that , 
not only has there been a large increase in inequality since 1980, but that the 
wealth of the economy, largely held by those at the top, will continue to grow 
faster than the overall economy.9 If capitalists save all of their income1 their 
wealth will grow at the rate of return, r, and if1 as he hypothesizes1 that is per-
sistently above the rate of growth of the economy, g, their wealth relative to 
national income will grow at the rate of r-g. 
Anecdotes aren't proofs, but they sometimes can alert us to factors that might 
have escaped attention in a simple model. John D. Rockefeller was America's 
first billionaire. At death, in 1937, his assets amounted to 1.5 percent of GDP. 
Had his assets grown at the rate "g" (the rate of growth of the economy) they 
would be worth today some $340 billion. If r (the relevant rate of return) were 
just 1 percent more than g, their family wealth should have grown to $680 
billion. If, using numbers that Piketty might say are still conservative, but more 
realistic, the disparity between g and r is 2 percent, then their wealth would 
have been $1.3 trillion. Instead, the total value of the family assets is estimated 
to be $10 billion - less than 1 percent of the predicted amount - divided among 
almost 300 members. 10 
A critique 
Three criticisms are raised against the Piketty analysis. First, once it is rec-
ognized that even capitalists consume, and that workers save out of wages 
(for life-cycle savings), then the neat relationship posited by Piketty for the 
ever-increasing capital-income ratio and inequality breaks down. For the 
wealth-income ratio of capitalists to be ever increasir1g would require sr> g, but 
in standard Solow model of growth1 where workers save at the same rate that 
capitalists do, that inequality does not hold in the long run. 
Secondly, the return to capital should be treated as endogenous. If the increase 
in wealth represented an increase in 11 capital, 11 then the law of diminishing 
returns would imply that the return to capital should have decreased. Once 
account is taken of the endogeneity of r, a more subtle analysis of the determi-
nants of wealth inequality is requlred. Indeed, even the central policy proposal, a 
(global) capital tax may not have the desired effect if there is tax shifting. 
The disparity between Wand K and the growth 
in land and other rents 
Thirdly, and most importantly, while both wealth and capital are aggregates, 
they are distinctly different concepts. Once one recognizes this, it becomes easy 
to reconcile the stylized facts with conventional theory. The wealth-income 
ratio could be increasing even as the capital-inco·me ratio (appropriately 
measured) is stagnating or decreasing. Much of wealth is not produced assets 
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("machines") but land11 or other ownership claims giving rise to rents. 12 Some 
of the increase in wealth is the increase in the capitalized value of what might 
be called exploitation rents - associated with monopoly rents and rents arising 
from other deviations from the standard competitive paradig1n. Some is an 
increase in the value of rents associated with intellectual property. 
But that forces the analysis back one step: how do we explain the increase in the 
magnitudes of rents and the value of these assets? And what is the relationship 
between the increase in the value of these assets and the increase in inequality? 
An analysis of the forces giving rise to the increase in land values and exploi~ 
talion rents provides some insights into why there has been such a marked 
increase in wealth (and income) inequality1 enables us to assess whether such 
increases are likely to continue, and to identify policies that might militate 
against these increases. If these assets are disproportionately owned by the 
rich, policies that lead to an increase in the value of these assets could have a 
first-order effect in increasing wealth inequality. We suggest that tax and finan-
cial market policies may have had these effects, and thus may have played an 
important role in the creation of today's high levels of inequality. 13 
Explaining the stylized facts 
Solow, Kaldor1 and a host of other economists produced a variety of models 
explaining the old stylized facts. But on the face of it, this would suggest that 
they cannot explaln the markedly different new stylized facts. It would seem 
that a new set of theories is required. 
This paper argues that only a slight (in the technical sense) modification of 
the old theories is required; but that while the modification may be techni-
cally small, this new theory has profound implications for how we view the 
economy, including for policy. Solow, and those working in the neoclassical 
tradition1 assumed markets were competitive, and that output was produced 
with labor and capital1 with a constant returns to scale production function. In 
that theory, rents played no role1 because under those assumptions, there were 
no rents. We argue, however, that changes in rents, broadly defined - inducting 
land rents, exploitation rents1 and rents on intellectual property - may be at 
the center of what has been happening; much of the increase in wealth is a 
result of the increase in (the capitalized value of) rents - and such increases 
do not increase, and may even decrease1 economic output. Economic analysis 
should focus on how changes in technology (including innovations that may 
have enhanced the ability of those with market power to leverage that power), 
iI1stitutions1 and policy may have increased these rents. 
Equilibrium theories 
This paper attempts to provide a set of coherent models that explain, or at 
least provide insights into, the new stylized facts. As in our earlier work, 14 a 
key part of our analysis is the insistence that there be consistency betvveen the 
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micro-behavior of agents and the macro-behavior of the economy, and that, 
crucial variables, like the rate of return on capital, be treated as endogenous. 
The paper argues that we can best understand what has been happening as 
a shift from one equilibrium to another. Overall wealth inequality is related 
both to the transmission mechanisms for human and financial capital across 
generations and to life cycle savings.15 In the models explored here1 there is an 
equilibrium distribution between inherited and life-cycle savings; but chaµges 
in key parameters can change that equilibrium. 
The models presented here differ, however, from earlier work in the analy-
sis of income and wealth distribution in four ways: (a) We explicitly consider 
models in which there is a second, non-produced, asset, land; (b) We develop 
models in which while many individuals' saving is primarily for life-cycle pur-
poses, there are a group of 11 capitalists" who pass significant amounts of wealth 
across generations; (c) We consider the possibility that the economy might not 
be fully competitive, and that there could be changes in the degree of market 
power; and ( d) Land can be used as collateral, and the value of land (or other 
fixed assets) may be affected by financial and monetary policies. 
The organization of the paper 
The paper is distributed in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the key 
anomalies presented by the new stylized facts, and explains how a focus on 
rents helps to resolve them. Part 11 re-examines the equilibrium wealth distribu-
tion within the context of a standard model without land. Part III takes up the 
observation of Part I that a large proportion of the increase in wealth is related 
to the increase in the price of real estate. It was understandable why land was 
ignored in earlier neoclassical models (including Solow's, and those, like my 
own, trying to explain inequality): in a modern economy, land is not a central 
input into production. But this is not quite true. About a quarter of GDP repre-
sents housing services1 of which land rents represent a significant proportion. 
(See the discussion below.) 
It was the omission of land that represents the most important lacuna in my 
1969 theory of the equilibrium distribution of wealth and income, which this 
paper attempts to rectify. We develop several models explaining the determina-
tion of the price of land, demonstrating why much of the increase in wealth 
would go into the value of land. It has long been recognized that there is a close 
link between financialization and inequality (Galbraith, 2012). We provide a 
set of models detailing that relationship/ describing how when some assets are 
collateralizable and others are not, a change in financial/monetary policy can 
affect the value of collateralizable wealth. We explain why the composition of 
wealth between capitalists and life cycle savers are different; and financial and 
monetary policies that differentially affect different assets can have accordingly 
a marked effect on wealth distribution. More generally, we argue that the way 
our credit system functions (or mal-functions) has played an important role 
both in the increase in the wealth-income ratio and in the increase in wealth 
inequality. 
Part I: Key Anomalies and Their Resolution 
The puzzles presented by the new stylized facts. As we noted in the introduction, 
economists had worked hard to explain the old stylized facts, and the theories 
they developed in response - and indeed theories developed over the past two 
hundred years - are challenged by the new stylized facts: 
(i) The standard theories predict that the capital-labor ratio eventually is a 
constant. The new 11 theory11 suggests that it is ever increasing (at a rate 
equal to g-r). 
(ii) Standard growth theory begins with the observation that r, the rate of 
return on capital, is an endogenous variable. Among the most basic laws 
of economics is the law of diminishing returns. If capitalists continue to 
invest at a rate faster than the groffih of the labor force, 16 then the rate of 
return to capital should diminish. 17 
(iii) Standard theories suggest that if the capital-output ratio increases, it 
is because there has been an increase in the capital-labor ratio. 18 An 
increase in the capital-labor ratio should be associated not only with a 
decrease in the return to capital r but as with an increase in wages; but as 
we have noted1 wages have stagnated. 
(iv) And while most (but not all) studies of the elasticity of substitution sug-
gest that it is less than unity, capital deepening would imply an increasing 
share of labor - contrary to the new stylized facts. 19•20 
(v) It is hard to reconcile the increase in the wealth-income ratio with 
national income account data on savings. There is a large unexplained 
component, which we call the wealth (or wealth-income) residual. 
It is thus hard to reconcile several of the new stylized facts with standard neo-
classical theory, if we interpret wealth, W, in the usual way as capital, K. In the 
first two subsections, we elaborate on these puzzles, providing the resolution 
in section 2.3. 
1.2 Key anomalies and their resolution 
1.2.1 The wealth-accumulation residual 
Here, we focus on the last of the puzzles: how we can reconcile the magnitude 
of the increase in wealth (capital) with national accounting data on savings. 
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Piketty and Zucman present data showing that the average net national sav-
ings rate of the US over the period 1970-2010 is 5.2 percent,21 and that the 
average growth rate of the economy was 2.8 percent. The wealth-income ratio 
varied, beginning the period at just under 4 and ending at about 4.6. Thus, 
treating for the moment 11K 11 and "W11 as identical (2.2) would have predicted 
a decline in the wealth-income ratio, at an average annual rate of somewhat 
more than 1.5 percent, in contrast to the observed increase. If these numbers 
were accurate1 the observed increase in wealth income ratios must come from 
somewhere else than the steady accumulation of capital goods.22 
This can be thought of as the 11wealth-accumulation residual" (analogous 
to the Solow residual - Solow had shown that capital accumulation could 
account for only a small fraction of the increase in productivity; the rest had 
to be explained somehow.) We will argue below that there is a simple explana-
tion of the residual - the increase in the capitalized value of rents, including 
land rents. 
We can reframe (2.2) to ask, what is the critical net savings rate such that 
there is an increase in the 11 real 11 capital-output ratio? Let k be the effective cap-
ital-labor ratio1 :t' be the '1naturaJl1 rate of growth of the economy, the sum of 
the rate of growth of population (work force) and the rate of labor augmenting 
technological progress, fJ= W/Y, and~ =K/W, the ratio of the value of produced 
capital to wealth (which includes land); then 
(2.3) 
so that capital deepening (defined as an increase in the capital output ratio) 
occurs if and only if 
S> g'{J¢. (2.4) 
If it were assumed that the US growth over the last forty years was close to 
its natural rate, 2.8 percent, (1=4, and ~=1 (land is an unimportant), thens 
would have to be greater than 11.2 percent, more than twice the net savings 
l 
rate for the US. More realistic, even if ¢=.8 1 s would have to be greater than 
8.9 percent. Given the US savings rate of 5.2 percent, only if ~<.46 will there 
be capital deepening. 
The US is an open economy, and there have been considerable capital 
inflows. These have varied considerably at a percentage of GDP. Assume capital 
inflows equal iY. Then 
d log (K/Y)/dt=(s+i)Y/K-g*=(s+i)/~s-g*. (2.3') 
Thus, adding to the earlier parameters (~=4; E,=1; s=S.2 percent) a reason-
able value of i=.02, d log (K/Y)/dt=-1 percent. Even taking account of capital 
inflows, the capital-output ratio falls at the rate of about 1 percent per year. 23 
Even if the savings rates were slightly higher, or the return to capital slightly 
higher, it is hard to generate plausible increases in the real capital stock that 
could account for the observed increases in the wealth-income ratios in recent 
decades.24 
There is still a different way of looking at the puzzle of the increase in wealth-
output ratios. Over the past sixty years, a wide variety of models describing the 
growth of the economy have been formulated. In each, ln the long run (steady 
state) there is a particular capital-output ratio. In each, changes in the under-
lying parameters (the rate of growth of the labor force, the rate of growth of 
labor-augmenting technological progress, and savings behavior) can explaln a 
change in the long run capital-output ratio. The question is, have there been 
any changes in these parameters sufficient to explain/account for changes in 
the capital-output ratio and the factor distribution of income of the magnitude 
observed? 
For instance, in the Solow growth model, the long-run capital-output ratio 
is given by s/g*, where again g* is the long-run growth rate, equal to the rate 
of growth of labor supply plus labor- augmenting technological change, and s 
is the savings rate. 25 g* has varied, for instance increasing in the 1990s and the 
first part of this century, while the savings rate (ln the US) has decreased, which 
would suggest a decrease in the long-un capital-output ratio, not an increase -
let alone an increase of the magnitude asserted.26,27 
1.2.2 Can wages fall, the capital-output ratio increase, 
and the return to capital not fall as k increases? 
The previous section argued that in none of the standard models of economic 
growth can one plausibly obtain an increase in the equilibrium value of the 
capital-output ratio of the magnitude observed if we interpret wealth as capital. 
If one interprets 11 W 11 as capital, then there has been not only an increase in 
the capital-output ratio, but also in the capital-labor ratio. Our ultimate objec-
tive is to understand the distribution of income, both among individuals and 
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among factor shares. We now ask, can wages fall (as they have been) ask (the 
capital-labor ratio) increases, within the standard neoclassical model. 
Movements in average wages. Some have suggested that some forms of capital 
are like robots, and compete directly with workers1 lowering their wages. But 
highly skilled workers still need to manage the robots, and even if the increased 
capital lowers the return to unskilled workers, it increases the return to the 
skilled workers. In Appendix A we show that under standard assumptions, an 
appropriately weighted average wage must increase. 
Data for the United States, for instance, shows otherwise: a stagnating or 
declining average wage rate during the past four decades, during which the 
capital-output ratio has increased - if we interpret 11wealth 11 as capital.28 
Movements in average productivity. Unfortunately, we typically cannot observe 
marginal productivities directly; but we do have data on average productivities, 
F=F(K)/L. It should be obvious that (if nothing else changes) :: = ~ > 0, 
i.e. average productivity should increase with capital deepening. 
Direct data on average productivity is consistent with this hypothesis. Thus, 
if we are to believe in the competitive determination of wages, given the large 
disparity in the movement of, say, the average productivity of the bottom 
99 percent and their average wage, then somehow a huge gap between move-
ments in marginal and average productivities must have opened up - a gap that 
has yet to be explained.29 
Technological change. There is a related hypothesis: that technological change 
has diminished the returns to unskilled labor. It is skill biased. 30 While the tim-
ing of the changes in the share of labor and the decrease even in wages of rela-
tively skilled labor in more recent years argues against skill biased technological 
change as the major or at least sole explanation of changes in distribution,31 
here we focus on the analytics. 
If there were a single type of labor, then labor-augmenting technological 
change increases the effective labor supply, and, everything else being the 
same
1 
would reduce the effective capital-labor ratio, and hence the wage per 
effective labor unit. But each worker would represent a larger number of effec-
tive labor units, so whether the wage per worker increases or decreases would 
depend on the elasticity of substitution." Only if the elasticity of substitution 
is substantially below unity would wages fall. (As we noted earlier, interpret-
ing wealth as 11K11 implies an elasticity of substitution greater than unity1 which 
would imply an increase in wages. Similar results hold in the longer run, when 
there is an adjustment in the capital stock.33) 
Assume now there are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and tech-
nology is skilled biased, say increasing the productivity of the skilled work-
ers, while leaving that of unskilled workers unchanged. Whatever the factor 
bias of technological change, it must move the factor price frontier outwards, 
which means that if the return to capital doesn't change, then the return to 
at least one of the two types of labor must increase. It is possible to show that 
if the return to capital remains unchanged, the average wage would have to 
increase.34 Again, it is not easy to reconcile observed patterns of changes in 
factor prices with the theory. 35 
1.2.3 The resolution of the seeming paradox: There is more 
to wealth than capital 
The previous two sections argued that it is hard to reconcile the new stylized 
facts with virtually any form of the standard growth model under the assumption 
that the increase in wealth corresponds to an increase in productive capital. What 
then is going on? 
The most plausible hypothesis is that wealth (W) and capital (K) are mark-
edly different objects (as Piketty himself recognizes, but the full implications 
of which he does not take on board), and that wealth can be going up even as 
capital (as conventionally understood) is going down. 1f capital is not going 
up much (or even going down) in tandem with the increase in the effective 
labor supply, it would explain why the interest rate has not gone down. (As 
we note below, we need to go further to explain the failure of the average 
wage to rise.) 
There are many forms of wealth that are not produced assets. Much of the 
increase in wealth in recent years is associated with an increase in the value of 
land. The increase in the value of land does not, however, mean that there is 
more land, and that therefore the productivity of labor should go up. And an 
increase in the value of land does not mean that the marginal productivity of 
capital should decrease. Once we sever the relationship between K and W, all 
the paradoxes described in the previous section disappear. 
Wealth as a measure of control over resources. The standard wealth income 
measure, constructed by adding up the money value of wealth and dividing 
it by the money value of income. Tracing how that ratio, and ownership of 
that wealth, evolves over time captures something that is important in our 
economy and how it is cl1anging: control over resources. But changes in the 
wealth distribution, so measured, do not even necessarily reflect well the dis-
tribution of "wellbeing.'' For the bundles of goods bought by those at different 
income/wealth levels may differ - indeed, in some of the models below, the 
increase in wealth is closely linked to the increase in the price of a good which 
is consumed only by the rich, so that the increase in inequality in wellbeing is 
markedly lower than the increase in money-wealth.36 
But what is clear is that the measure of wealth so constructed is not a good 
measure of the relevant inputs into the production process - wealth could be 
going up, and yet any reasonable measure of inputs could be moving in the 
opposite direction. 
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Index number problems and wealth as a measure of productive inputs." Not 
only are the concepts different, but there are difficult measurement problems 
involved in each. Both are aggregates, and an aggregate constructed for one 
purpose may not be appropriate for another. The "volume" of capital goods 
resulting from saving out of national income (letting consumption goods be 
the numeraire) will be affected by changes in the price of capital goods relative 
to consumption goods. And the effective increase in 11K11 will also be affected by 
capital augmenting technological change. (Indeed, the two issues are closely 
related; because there are constant changes in the design of capital goods, one 
has to establish a "hedonic" index of equivalency.) If the only capital good 
were computers, the increase in the 11volu1ne 11 of K fron1 a given amount of 
savings would have increased enormously over time. In calculating aggregate 
11 K/1 we have to add up capital of different types, whose relative prices and 
productivities are changing over time. 
But even abstracting from these subtleties, and assuming that there were a 
single capital good, K, and a single fixed factor, land, T, we can easily see that 
movements in K do not adequately summarize what is happening to aggregate 
input (relative to labor). If land is a factor of production,38 then wages will be 
related to inputs of both K and T. If T is fixed, then the increase in K has to 
be proportionally greater-possibly much greater - than the increase in labor 
supply to ensure that wages increase, to offset the failure of T to rise. 
In short, we need to add up K and T somehow to ascertain what is happen-
ing to the aggregate input, which we will refer to as C. How we add the two 
together matters a great deal. And what makes sense for one purpose or ii\ the 
context of one model or an economy with one technology may not in another. 
If T and K were additive in the production function i.e. Y=F(K+T, L), the!\ 
to assess what is happening to the aggregate i11put, which we call C, we simply 
add K and T up linearly.39 In the case of France, this aggregate "C" has been 
going up more slowly than GDP, even though K has been going up slightly 
faster than GDP (see Figure 1.1).40 
On the other hand, we could have a production function of the form 
Y=F(C, L) (2.5) 
where now 
(2.6) 
Then, since Tis fixed, 
d d 











(K + T) /GDP 
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Figure 1.1 GDP and inputs in France 
Source: Chart provided by Paul Schreyer, based on OECD national accounts data and INSEE Comptes 
du patrimoine. 
Now, C is increasing if K is increasing, but whether it is increasing faster or 
slower than GDP depends on the relative weights assigned to the two inputs, ~· 
With even a relatively high value of~' C/Y appears to be declining for France. 
Notice that for the United States, d log "C" /din t~.Ol l;<.028, so that even if 
the wealth-income ratio is increasing, f is declining at a rapid rate, in excess 
of 1 percent per year. y 
The production function defined by (2.5) and (2.6) has the interesting 
property that W increases in proportion to K, but it would be totally wrong 
to confuse W with K. More generally, depending on the parameter I;, the rate 
of increase in W can be much larger or smaller than that in K. d(W /Y) > o 
d (c) dt 
while dt y < 0 if (refer to Appendix B for a formal treatment) 
g/J(<s<gfJ. (2.8) 
As we noted, for the United States, the latter inequality is clearly satisfied, while 
for plausibly small values of f, so is the former. 
This analysis makes clear that different indices, different measures of C, can 
differ not just in the magnitude by which they change over time, but even in 
the direction of change; and an appropriate measure of aggregate input could 
have gone down even though the standard measure of wealth increased. 
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Other data problems. This section has explained why data on wealth do not 
reflect 11 capital. 11 Several of the stylized facts involved inequality metrics. There 
are serious problems associated with measuring the factor distribution. Because 
our tax system taxes capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary wage income, 
there are incentives to try to recategorize labor income as capital income (for 
example, private equity and carried interest). Going the other way, large frac-
tions of the income of banks is paid out in bonuses to their managers, and thus 
treated as wage income in the national accounts. Likewise for the managers in 
other corporations. But there is a fundamental difference between these pay-
ments and ordinary wages. To a large extent, the managers determine their 
own pay. Though often referred to as incentive pay, the link between pay and 
performance is weak, evidenced so clearly in the 2008 recession;41 the money 
can better be thought of as a return on the control rights of the firm. While 
such property rights normally are not sold or bought in open markets (though 
occasionally they are, often with much contestation), they are transferred from 
one group of managers to their successors1 and in the process there can be 
a significant gift exchange (that is, a provision of even a more generous retire-
ment benefit than was contracted for) in the expectation of a similar transfer 
upon their retirement. If we appropriately relabel such income as non-wage 
income, then the share of wages would have declined even more than shown 
by the standard data series.42,43 
1.2.4 Parsing out the wealth residual 
We argued in section 1.2.1 that it is hard to reconcile national savings data 
with the observed increase in wealth. There was what we referred to as the 
11wealth residual. 11 There are, in fact, three reasons that W can increase without 
a concomitant increase in K1 besides an increase in the value of land. There 
could be an increase in the value of other inelastically supplied factors. 44 There 
can be an increase in the value of intellectual property. Or there can be an 
increase in what might be called 11 exploitation11 rents. In the discussion below, 
we will use the term 11market power11 and 11 exploitation11 interchangeably. The 
deviations from the competitive benchmark that we are interested in here take 
on many forms besides that classically associated with imperfect competition 
in product or labor markets. There can also be exploitation by corporate or 
other special interests of the public: indeed, it was in this context that the term 
rent-seeking first got coined. 
Some of the increase in wealth, as we shall see, has as much to do with 
our accounting frameworks as with anything else. Some of these instances of 
an increase in measured wealth are actually associated with decreases in the 
effective productivity of the economy. 
Changes in rents on land and other non-produced assets. In later sections of 
this paper we model the determination of land rents and the value of fixed 
assets. A decrease in the interest rate (normally associated with capital deep-
ening) should lead to an increase in the value of such assets. As population 
increases, the scarcity value of particularly attractive sites (like land in the 
Riviera) becomes greater. Much of the value of land today is in urban areas; 
as the population in key urban centers increases, 45 the value of land in these 
cities increases. 
There is considerable evidence that recent decades have shown 11 a histori-
cally unprecedented boom in global house prices ... Rising land prices explain 
about 80 percent of the global house price boom that has taken place since 
World War IL 1146 The increase in land prices thus accounts for much of the 
increase in wealth and wealth-income ratios. 
There can be an increase in the value of any asset fixed in supply: The 
wealthy strive not just to own homes in the Riviera but also Renaissance paint-
ings. Thus, the discussion of positional goods in Part IV of this paper applies 
to these other assets as well as to land. In a world with increasing population, 
and fixed supplies of depletable natural resources, the value of these resources 
too can be expected to increase.47 
Changes in market power and exploitation. There is an increasing consensus 
that much of observed inequality - especially at the top - is associated with 
rent seeking1 including the exercise of monopoly power.48 If monopoly power 
of firms increases1 it will show up as an increase in the income of capital, and 
the present discounted value of that will show up as an increase in wealth 
(since claims on the rents associated with that market power can be bought 
and sold.)49 
The magnitude of the associated increases in the capital-wealth ratio from 
even a small increase in exploitation can be significant. A permanent increase 
in the share of capital by just 1 percent would, when capitalized at a real dis-
count rate of 1.5 percent, imply an increase of the wealth-income ratio of .67; 
an increase of market exploitation leading to an increase in the share of capital 
by 5 percent would lead to an increase in the wealth-income ratio by more 
than 3.50 
There is an extensive literature discussing why we might expect an increase 
in monopoly power in a modern economy1 for example1 as a result of network 
externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1994) and the fixed costs associated with 
research (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). (Many of these arguments, however, 
are inconsistent with the assumption of a constant returns to scale production 
function.) So too1 the transformation of the economy towards the service sec-
tors may have increased the importance of local monopolies (see Greenwald 
and Kahn, 2009). Note that such increases in wealth are associated with 
a decrease in the economy's effective productivity, because they are associated 
with an increase in market distortions. Moreover, it is an implication of such 
exploitation that even though W is increasing1 wages are decreasing. 
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V\Thile increases in monopoly rents are the most obvious example of an 
increase in wealth not associated with an increase in the productive capacity 
of the economy, tl1ere are many other forms of exploitation which may have 
increased in recent decades; the capitalized value of any such change would 
show up as a change in wealth. 
Elsewhere, we and others (Galbraith, 2012) have focused on the role of 
the financial sector in increasing inequality. The financial sector grew before 
the 2008 crisis from 2 percent to 8 percent of GDP. Profits grew to absorbing 
40 percent of all corporate profits. There are reasons to believe that much of 
this might be associated with exploitation rents (including those associated 
with market manipulation, insider trading, predatory lending, 51 and anti-
competitive practices arising from their control of the payments mechanisms, 
giving rise as well to abusive practices in credit and debit cards, and so on) 
and capitalized in the value of wealth. Though there was some increase in the 
amount of wealth to be managed, tl1e increase in the wealth-income ratio was 
not so substantial to account for the increase in the share of the financial sec-
tor; nor can that sector1s remuneration be accounted for by the improvements 
in their management of the funds, and even less so, by any improvement in 
overall economic performance. sz 
If the financial sector improved its ability to exploit the poor through 
predatory and discriminatory lending practices and abusive credit card prac-
tices (and the resulting profits were not bid away because of imperfections of 
competition) then there would be an increase in standard metrics of wealth.53 
Other fonns of exploitation of consumers. The financial sector has perhaps 
deservedly earned a reputation for its ability to exploit - to take advantage of 
imperfections of information and limitations of individuals' ability to process 
information. But other sectors have also increased their capacity to create and 
exploit such imperfections. Behavioral economics has exposed a large number 
of 11irrationalities 11 in individuals' behavior, instances for example in which 
individuals systematically overestimate some risk and underestimate others. 
Corporations have now begun systematically to exploit such irrationalities to 
increase their profits. 
Successful corporate rent-seeking: transfers from the public sector to the private. 
There are more subtle forms of 11 exploitation. 11 Government allows 11too-big-
to-fail" banks. The value of those banks is higher than they otherwise would 
be, because of government risk-absorption. But the contingent liability of the 
government is not capitalized, and because this liability doesn't show up in 
the national balance sheet, it appears as if the wealth of the economy has 
increased. But with appropriate metrics (where the decreased wealth of wage-
earning citizens, as a result of the increase in the expected present discounted 
value of the higher taxes that they will have to pay to bail out the banks), just 
the opposite would have happened: we would have recognized that because of 
the distortions associated with too-big-to-fail banks, the productive capacity 
of the economy has been diminishedi that the bail-outs are Pareto-inefficient, 
and that the wealth of the economy has been diminished. 54 
In each of these situations, a change in the flow of resources that accrues to 
11 capital 11 gets capitalized in wealth, and the present discounted value of the 
decreased flow to the rest of the economy is not reflected in our wealth metrics. 
We don't~ for instance, value the change in the strea1n of tax revenues to the govern-
ment or the expenditures by the government or the reduced wages accruing to workers 
as a result of increased market exploitation. 
Knowledge and infonnation rents. Earlier, we explained how firms can generate 
rents by creating and exploiting information asymmetries. In a modern econ-
omy, there are many other ways by which knowledge and information differen-
tials can give rise to rents. Insider trading and market manipulation (e.g. in the 
Libor and Foreign Exchange markets) are the most obvious examples. There are 
reasons to believe that much of the profits generated by high frequency trading 
is a sophisticated form of front-running, taking advantage of differential access 
to information (Stiglitz, 2014c). These information rents are often primarily 
distributive, increasing incomes of some individuals at the expense of others. In 
some cases, they even lead to Pareto inefficiency.55 When capitalized, however1 
they lead to an increase in wealth, even if net income is decreased. 
Intellectual property. There is another, closely related and increasingly impor-
tant category of assets, intellectual property. Here, there have been three factors 
contributing to the increased market value of intellectual property: there may 
be more knowledge; the value of any 11 pieceu of knowledge increases as the size 
of the economy (other inputs) increase - knowledge and these other inputs are 
complementary; and more of knowledge has been privately appropriated, and 
hence shows up in wealth data. 56 Knowledge that is freely available increases 
output, but doesn't show up in anybody's balance sheet and therefore would 
not normally be reflected in the national accounts as wealth. But changes in 
the intellectual property regime (what Boyle (2003) refers to as the enclosure 
of the knowledge commons) has resulted in an increase in the wealth of those 
who are given these property rights." 
Changes in discount rates and risk management. There is a further reason for an 
increase in the value of wealth without a concomitant increase in the physical 
productive capital stock: the rate of discount may fall - for example, because 
of a decrease in the interest rate - and this may induce large changes in the 
relative price of different goods (and in the price of capital goods relative to 
consumption). This was the essential issue in the Cambridge-Cambridge con-
troversy some half a century ago1 where it was observed that tl1e value of capi-
tal and the choice of technique may be non-monotonic in the interest rate. 58 
In the private sector, the relevant discount rate is the after tax return, so 
that there are two offsetting effects on the value of wealth of an increase in 
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the tax on capital. In the lirniting case where before tax returns are unaffected, 
the value of an asset yielding a before-tax return of R every year would be 
unchanged i.e. v = (l -t)R = R/r. The value of assets facing an average tax rate 
(1-t)r 
greater than that relevant for the discount rate will go down; and conversely if 
the average tax rate is smaller. 
Changes in risk management and the ability to absorb risk can also have 
effects on the wealth-income ratio.59 At the same mean and variance of the 
return to an asset, such changes lead to an increase in the certainty equiv&}ent 
return, and therefore of the market value. If the improved risk management/ 
ability to absorb risk leads to a lower discount rate, the increase in market v&lue 
can be even larger. 
There can also be countervailing general equilibrium effects. Individuals may 
reallocate more of their wealth to assets with a higher risk and higher mean 
return, i.e. assets which (on average) 11ave a lower capital-income ratio. 
Part II: Equilibrium Wealth Distributions 
in Neoclassical Models 
A key concern in the growing inequality in the United States and other 
advanced countries is the worry that we are giving rise to an inherited plu~ 
tocracy. Piketty (2014) emphasized that ifs,= 1 and the rate of interest were 
greater than the rate of growth, inherited wealth would increase faster than 
the growth in income. On the other hand, the fact that individuals are liv-
ing longer and must save for their retirement means that life cycle savings is 
increasing, reflected in part in the huge increase in pension funds. 60 In this 
section, we construct a simple model incorporating both inherited and life 
cycle savings. 
We are able to obtain simple formulae describing the equilibrium share of 
wealth held by life cycle savers. Using these formulae, we can easily ascertain 
the effects of, say, tax policy or changes in the parameters of the economy. We 
show that an increase in the savings rate of workers (as a result1 for instance of 
encouraging them to save more) has no effect on output per capita, but i:loes 
increase the share of wealth of life cycle savers. Life cycle savings crowds out 
inherited savings. On the other hand, a tax on capital (even if it is paid dispro-
portionately by the rich capitalists, with proceeds paid out to workers, and so 
is therefore viewed as progressive) will be so shifted that capitalists are unaf-
fected and workers1 income, including transfers, actually goes down, as \:foes 
their share in national wealth. This bears out a general theme of this paper: 
tax policies have to be constructed to take into account general equilibrium 
incidence effects. 
1.3 Savings models 
This section is divided into two parts. The first presents the basic model, while 
in the second, we assume all individuals have identical savings functions. The 
only difference is that when wealth is low enough, bequests drop to zero. 
1. 3.1 Basic Model 
We assume two groups: There are workers who live two periods, and save for 
their retirement.61 Their savings is referred to as /(life cycle saVings. 11 Then 
there are the capitalists, who save a fixed percentage of their income, sP" 62 For 
simplicity, we use a discrete time model. 
In this section! output is produced by means of a neoclassical constant 
returns to scale production function Q=F(K,L), where K is the capital stock 
and L the labor supply (there is full employment). k=K/L is the capital-labor 
ratio. Q/L=F/L=f(k) gives output per worker as a function of the capital-
labor ratio. The return to capital is f' 1 and the wage rate is f-kf'. We assume that 
the number of capitalists and workers increase at the same rate, n (assumed 
here to be exogenous.) (In this simple version1 we ignore labor augmenting 
technological progress. It is straightforward to bring it into the analysis.) 
The difference equations describing the evolution of the system are 
given by63 
(1 +n)ki+i = (1 +s,,f'(k,))K, (3.1) 
and 
k;+ 1 =(1 +r) s(k1+1)w(k,)/(l +n) (3.2) 
where kw and kc are workers1 and capitalists1 capital (per capita), respectively, 
where we have allowed the savings rate of workers to depend on the (rationally 
expected) interest rate1 64 and where 
(3.3) 
where 6 is the ratio of workers to capitalists. (By assumption capitalists supply 
no labor. Recall that k, which enters the production function, is the ratio of the 
capital stock to workers, not the per capita capital stock.) 6 is assumed to be fixed. 
These equations fully describe the dynamics, given an initial value of 
workers' and capitalists1 capital.65 In the steady state, kf*=k~ =k~+i and similarly 
for kw,. Hence, from (3.1) 
n=s,,f'(k*), (3.4) 
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where k* is the steady-state value of k and f(k*) is the steady-state return on 
capital, equal to r. Note that r here is the return over a generation, i.e. if a gen-
eration is 30 years1 and the annual interest rate is 2 percent, r= 1. The steady-
state level of capital (and the equilibrium interest rate) is determined simply by 
capitalists' saving propensity. 
If workers save more, the economy does not become richer; income does not 
go up; wages do not increase. All that happens is that they increase their share 
of total capital. 
The steady-state capital of workers (life cycle capital) given by (where we look 
at workers' wealth as of the beginning of their period of retirement1 after earn-
ing interest, rather than at the end of their working life) 






Using (3.4) this can be rewritten 
s(k*)w(k*{ 1 + * J 
(1 + n)f'-1 [;, J 





The ratio of wealth of life-cycle savers to that of capitalists (or to total wealth) 
depends on the relative savings rates, the relative shares (recall that Sk is the 
share of capital), and the growth rate. A decrease in the growth rate would (if 
the elasticity of substitution is less than one and if the savings rate did not_ 
change) lead to an increase in the capital-labor ratio and a decrease in the 
share of capital. There is a critical value of the elasticity of substitution, such 
that below that threshold, a decrease in the growth rate leads to an increased 
share of life-cycle savings, and above that threshold, it leads to a decreased 
share. (The rate of return to capital does not enter into this formula, because 
it is an endogenous variable. But this analysis has ignored the effects on 
workers' savings rate: A decrease in the growth rate leads to a lower interest 
rate, and this can lead to either a higher or lower value of s depending on 
the sign of s'.)66 
If the savings rate of workers increases1 for instance because of increased 
expected retirement longevity,67 workers' wealth increases proportionately, while 
aggregate wealth remains unchanged. By the same token, in this model, if the 
generosity of social serurity increases1 so the savings rate of workers decreases/ 
workers' wealth (excluding their claims on social security) decreases proportion-
ately, while aggregate wealth remains unchanged (in a pay-as-you-go system). 
There is an important qualification to. this analysis: workers' savings has 
to be low enough so that, on their own1 they do not drive the rate of return 
below n/sp. For if they do, then the life cycle savers eventually drive out the 
capitalists.68 It would appear that this condition is normally satisfied. 
Market distortions The analysis so far has assumed that workers are able to get 
the same return on their investments as capitalists. We then obtain 
s*(l + [.!:_J <;(1- r~)/(1- r")) 
kAw* S 1-S 
--=n P k 
k" s,(l+n) s, 
where rw, the return workers receive on their investments1 is r; times that of 
capitalists, and 'tcw is the effective tax rate on the return to capital for life 
cycle savings , 'tee that on the return to capital for capitalists. Thus kkA:* will 
be lower than suggested by the basic model if (a) a distorted financial market 
delivers to life cycle savers lower returns than those received by capitalists; 
and (b) regressive taxation leads to life cycle savers facing higher tax rates (than 
those confronting capitalists). An example of the former that has recently been 
exposed is how conflicts of interest among those managing large fractions of 
IRA accounts lead to substantially lower returns on those accounts. Part II 
provided several other reasons for why life cycle savers might receive lower 
returns on their investments than do capitalists. The share of life cycle savings 
will be further lowered if, as we suggested in section 2, because of monopolies 
and other distortions the share of capital is larger than it would have been in 
a competitive equilibrium. 
1.3.1.1 The effect of taxation 
If we impose a tax on capital at the rate r', we obtain instead of (3.4) 
n= (1-r')s,f(k'), (3.4a) 
implying that the a~er-tax retnm to capital is not affected by the tax (just as was 
the case in the Kaldor model). There is, in effect, full "shifting." As the tax rate 
increases, the equilibrium capital stock diminishes.69 
Capital taxation with proceeds distributed to workers. To ascertain the effect on 
the relative importance of lifecycle savings, we have to specify what happens 
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to the tax revenue. Assume it is redistributed to workers. Then the transfer 1 
(per capita) is given by 
\=r'r(k*)k*. (3.8) 
Noting that in our simplified model, the saving rate depends only on the after 
tax rate of return, and from (3.4a) that is unchanged, and Jetting s* denoted 
that value of s, (3.6) can be rewritten as 
kw* 
k* 
[ l+f, }•(w(k*)+) 
(1 + n)k* 
(3.9) 
Then, to ascertain the effect of an increase in the tax rate on the share of inher~ 




Normally, an increase in the tax rate lowers the wage, but at least for low re 
increases the transfer. 
Workers' lifetime income yw=w(k*)+11 so that70 





dr' (1-r')f"(k*) · (3.12) 
The sign of (3.11) is thus that of 
r'=O.) 
'(f'(k*))z dYw r <0 for O<r'<l. (-,-=0 at 
(1-r ')f"(k*) dr 
Hence, the loss in wages is always greater than the benefit from the transfer. 
It follows that an increase in the interest income tax always increases the 
relative importance of inherited wealth. 71 
The tax also has an adverse effect on the distribution of consumption (wellbeing). 
Since the after~tax interest rate facing capitalists is the same, their flow 
of consumption (in steady state) is unaffected. Workers' lifetime utility is a 
function of their income, yw, and the interest they receive on their savings 
(after tax). We have already shown the derivative of yw with respect to r' is 
negative (except at rc=01 where it is zero). But because the after-tax return the 
worker receives from his investment is unaffected, workers are unambiguously 
worse off. 
Thus! in the case that would seenz to be the most favorable to workers - where 
all the proceeds are redistributed to them - their income is reduced, their wel-
fare is reduced, and inequality is increased. 
Inheritance tax with proceeds distributed to workers. With an inheritance tax, 
there is still tax shifting: wages fall and the before-tax return on capital for capi-
talists increases. Appendix C shows that the relative share of life cycle savings 
may increase, so long as the elasticity of substitution is not too small, and that 
there is an optimal tax rate, maximizing workers' wellbeing. 
Public investment. So far, the results of this section on the ability of the 
government to improve the wealth distribution through capital taxation are 
somewhat disheartening. If, instead1 government invests the tax proceeds as 
well as the proceeds it gets from its investments, then an increasing fraction 
of the capital stock will be owned by the government. The government invest-
ment drives down the return to capital, so that the wealth of the capitalists 
can't keep up with the increase in population. Their wealth diminishes (per 
capita), and we get a new equilibrium which is similar to the original equilib-
rium except that now the government owns all the capital and, in effect, its 
saving rate is unity. Then wages are higher, and workers are unambiguously 
better off. Note that this would be true even if the government were slightly 
less efficient than the private sector.72 
If we expand the model to a three-factor production function, Y~F(K,, Kg, L), 
with private and public capital goods, and (some of) the proceeds from the tax 
are invested into the public capital good, then it is easy to show that there can 
be a new equilibrium in which a (somewhat poorer) capitalist class survives but 
the tax may still have a positive effect on workers: In a three-factor production 
function, KP and L can be substitutes, and Kg and L can be complements, so that 
on both accounts, wages are increased as a result of the tax; but the increase in Kg 
is consistent with the after tax return to capital returning to its previous level.73 
Progressive capital taxation74 A progressive capital income tax can affect the 
degree of inequality among the rich. 75 The argument for a progressive capital 
tax is strengthened if we look more carefully at the nature of the measured 
returns to capital. In economists' simplest models, all capital receives the same 
returns. If returns are stochastic, then it is simply luck that determines who 
gets high returns. If that were all that there were to the matter, a progressive 
tax on the rate of return to capital in excess of the average return (with offsets 
for returns below that level) would be welfare increasing, if capitalists were risk 
averse. If savings were elastic in the certainty equivalent return, then savings 
would increase, and workers would be better off. 
There may, however, be other possible explanations for above average returns. 
The returns could represent greater skill at investing, in which the returns 
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ought to be viewed as a return to labor, not as a return to capital. 76 The returns 
could represent a return to risk taking. If capital markets are imperfect (so risk 
is not fully diversified) and individuals are risk averse, riskier investments will 
yield higher returns than safe. A proportional capital tax on excess returns (over 
the safe rate of interest) would, under these circumstances1 increase risk taking, 
and thereby average incomes. Finally, the returns could in part be a return to 
exploitation. To the extent that that is the case, 77 then a progressive tax would 
discourage such rent seeking behavior, increase economic efficiency1 improve 
the wellbeing of those who are being exploited, and reduce overall inequality. 
1.3.2 Toward a more general model 
The previous subsection assumed that society is composed of two groups of 
individuals - workers who engage in life cycle savings, and capitalists who 
pass on wealth from one generation to the other. ln fact, however1 all indi-
viduals could have the same savings function; it is simply past circumstances 
that determine the observed savings rate. Assume1 for instance1 that proviO.ing 
bequests is a 11luxury
1
11 and that when individuals' wealth exceeds a certain 
level, they begin to act like capitalists, passing on money to their heirs. 
We assume gross savings of any individual are a function of his end of period 
wealth, which is just his wage and the return on the capital from the previous 
period: s(W,)W0 where 
W,=w,+(1 +r,)k, (3.13) 
But assume s(W,) is S-shaped, the extreme version of which would be s=s0 for 
w:s;W* and S==S1 >>So for W> W*. 78 Then there exists a two~class equilibrium. 
To see the nature of the equilibrium, assume a fixed fraction of the population 
tl are in the upper income group. Then 
s,(w(k))+(l+r(k)k,)=(l+n) (k1) i=0,1 (3.14) 
(3.15) 
For each value of tl, there is a different equilibrium, that is, k,=k,(tl). 
Special cases of this model yield the standard Solow and Kaldor/Pasinetti/life 
cycle model. If tl=O, we obtain the discrete variant of the Solow model. On the 
other hand, if s0 ~o, (3.14) can be approximated by 
s1 (1 +r(k) +%w(k)) = 1 + n, (3.16) 
Here, it is not that the workers have a different savings function from that 
of the capitalists; it is only that their income is low so they save little. Most 
importantly, we have endogenously derived a two-class model out of a S-shaped 
savings function. 
In this model {!is determined just by history. For each, there is a steady state 
(k1, kz). Individuals never leave the "class" into which they are born. But it is 
easy to construct a stochastic model in which some in the upper class have 
bad luck and move down1 and some in the lower have good luck and move 
up. il is then solved for endogenously, related to the transition probabilities 
(see Stiglitz, 201Sb). Changes in policy, behavior and technology (the savings 
functions, the stochastic processes) can move the economy from one in which 
most individuals are in the "upper group" (the middle class society of the 
past) to one in which most are in the lower group (the "99 percent/I percent 
society of the present.) Financial sector 11innovations 11 that encouraged those 
at lower wealth not to save and regressive capital taxation might, for instance, 
accomplish this. 
Part III: Land Rents 
In section I of this paper, we noted that standard neoclassical models focusing 
on capital and labor in competitive markets could not explain the increase in 
the wealth-output ratio observed in the US and many other advanced coun-
tries and other stylized facts of modern economies. 79 Central to our resolution 
of these puzzles, we suggested, was the understanding that wealth and capital 
were different concepts. The most important source of the disparity between 
the growth of wealth and the growth of productive capital is the growth 
of the value of land - not associated with any increase in the amount of land 
and therefore of the productivity of the economy. 80 
In this part, we present a series of models that might account for much of 
the increase in the value of wealth taking the form of an increase in the price 
of land. These models not only help us understand the increase in the wealth-
income ratio, but also the increase in wealth inequality. This part is divided 
into five sections. In section 1.4, we extend the life cycle/inheritance model of 
section 1.3 to land. Section 1.5 presents the simplest model with land rents, 
showing that even in this very simple model, the increase in wealth may be 
markedly greater than the increase in capital. Section 5 examines land as a 
positional good, deriving a similar result that increases in wealth are greater 
than increases in capital. Section 1.6 investigates the dynamics of land prices, 
showing that in a natural formulation, bubbles can easily arise, and along 
such 11bubble paths,'1 wealth may increase, even though capital (per capita) 
is decreasing. In effect, wealth accumulation in the form of land may crowd 
out real capital accumulation.81 The final section explores how financial and 
monetary policies can give rise to an increase in land prices and thus "wealth, 11 
but such increases in wealth may have little to do with what is happening to 
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the real wealth of the economy - which in this simple model is reflected in the 
value of the capital stock (per capita.) 
There is one further (important) explanation of an increase in land values: 
the increase in urbanization leads to an increase in urban land values, the value 
of being in proximity to urban centers.82 
1.4 Land in a life cycle model 
In section 1.3, we formulated a life cycle model, and used it to explain the 
division of wealth between capitalists and workers (life time savers). It is easy 
to incorporate land into this framework. Now, however, because land is a store 
of value that is alternative to capital, there is an important question: could 
savings that otherwise be used for capital accumulation be deflected into land, 
thereby harming workers? 
1.4.1 Pure life cycle model 
We begin our analysis with the case where there are only life cycle savers, but 
there is a fixed asset, which we will call land. 
It is useful to rewrite (3.2) to focus on "savings in capital": 
s(w(k),r(k))w(k)-fr• = k. 
f, 
Any value of k solving ( 4. la) is a steady-state equilibrium. 
(4.la) 
There can be multiple equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. As k increases, 
wages increase. The slope of the LHS can be greater or less than unity, and 
can vary with k, so that the LHS can cross the 45 degree line more than once. 
There is a natural sense in which stability requires that the savings curve cut 
the 45 degree locus from above, i.e. the increase in savings into capital from an 
increase in the capital stock is less than the increase in the capital stock itself. 
Looking across (steady-state) equilibria, it is clear that, letting W denote 








Figure 1.2 Multiple equilibria in pure life cycle mode 
By the same token, we can ask what happens if there is an upward shift in 
the savings function, i.e. the savings function is given by ys(w(k), r(k)). Then 
dk SW 
dy (1 + fT,,!f, - fT·f .. lf,2)(l +n)-ysw' -yw: (4.4) 
while, from (4.2), 
(4.S) 
Again, we get the result that W can increase more thank. Some of the increased 
savings goes into an increased value of land, reducing the benefits tl1at other-
wise would have accrued to a higher savings rate. 
Taxing capital. A tax on the return to wealth (both land and capital) will shift 
the function sw-fT,/f, up or down depending on whether s is decreasing or 
increasing in r (increasing or decreasing in k), which implies that in a stable 
equilibrium1 it will lead to an increased or decreased value of k depending on 
whether s' is greater or less than zero. The change in wealth will typically be 
larger than the change ink (so long as inequallty (4.3) is satisfied). But while 
in a two-factor production function, a decrease in k necessarily leads to a 
lower wage, now it may not. Capital and labor may be substitutes rather than 
complements. (Robots may be a substitute for unskilled labor.) 
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Taxing land. It is easy to see that in this model, a tax on the value of land the 
proceeds of which are distributed to workers results in an increase in investment 
and a reduction in the return to capital (in a stable equilibrium).83 If FKL> 0 
(labor and capital are complements) wages will rise. A fortiori, if the revenues 
are fully invested, wages go up even more. 
1.4.2 A two-class model 
In this section, we return to our two-class model of section 1.3 1 but intro-
duce land. For simplicity, we focus only on the steady state. 84 But this poses a 
problem in the absence of land-augmenting technological change and popula-
tion growth: if the equilibrium interest rate would go to zero (as it would if n were 
equal to zero), the value of land would go to infinity. There are at least two ways 
out of this puzzle: (a) assume land does not yield any return or (b) assume land 
augmenting technological progress at the rate n. Here, we take the latter tack, 
and express all units in per capita terms (per unit of effective land). 
The variables of interest can all be expressed as functions of k. The returns 
to land must equal the returns to holding capital. In steady state, the price of 
a unit of effective land, denoted by q, will be constant. Letting fr' denote the 
marginal return of a unit of effective land, which in steady state is constant, 
q = fr, 
1 
in the obvious notation, where wages and returns to capital are 
(, 
functions of the capital stock per capita. Savings are put either into capital 
goods or into land holdings. 
Instead of (3.1) the capitalists' wealth accumulation equation is described by 
k' T' -W:' _ ki +q,T,' +spf,(k,)(ki +q,T,') (l+spf,(k,))W,' (4_6) 
t+1 +q1+1 t+1 - t+1 - l+n l+n 
where r; is the effective landholdings of the capitalists at time t (here, per 
capita) and q is the price of an effective unit of land. In steady state, the return 
to capital and the return to land (the return to each of the assets) is the same. 
The rate of interest must be equal to the rate of growth divided by the savings 
propensity of capitalists, as before, and that implies a particular value of k=k*. 
We similarly rewrite (3.2) as (continuing with the obvious notation) 
V\i(~+l) = s(kc1+1i)w;1' /l + n. (4.7) 
Hence, the steady-state equation for life cycle wealth relative to total wealth 
is now just 
W'"* s(k*)w(k*) 
W* (l+n)W* 
s(k*)w(k*) k*=n s(k*) 1-S, 
k* (1 + n) W* (1 + n)s, S,(l +x) (4.8) 
where x= the ratio of the value of land to capital. In this case, q* = f,f,, · 
,~n 
Changes in worker savings 11ave no effect on wealth; an increase in capitalists1 
savings rate leads to an increase in k, with an effect on wealth that is normally 
greater than the increase in k because of the increased value of land, as in the 
earlier model. 
We can easily study the effect of various forms of taxation on the distribution 
of income and wealth (between capitalists and life-cycle savers); these effects 
are markedly different than in the pure life cycle model of the previous subsec-
tion because of tax shifting. Land taxation has no effect on k*, hence no effect 
on wages; it leads to a diminution of the value of wealth. If the proceeds of 
the tax are distributed to workers, life cycle wealth is increased1 and therefore 
on both accounts, wealth inequality is reduced. (Similar results hold for land 
capital gains taxes.) Inheritance taxation, as in section 31 leads to an increase in 
the before tax return on capital, lowering k. If capital and labor are substitutes, 
then capital and land have to be complements, and the tax on inherited capital 
unambiguously reduces wealth inequality. Wages go up and the return to land 
goes down, so the share of wealth held in life cycle savings unambiguously 
goes up. But if capital and labor are complements, the opposite may happen. 85 
1.5 A simple model with land rents 
To see more clearly the relationship between wealth and capital, we can formu-
late an even simpler model than the life cycle model of the previous section. 
Assume the rents associated with land are fixed and last in perpetuity, while the 
production of industrial goods requires no land. Then a slight decrease in the 
(long-term real) interest rate can lead to a large increase in the value of land.86 
Thus, national output is given by 
Q=F(K,L)+R (5.1) 
where Q is total output, K is productive capital and L is labor, for the moment 
assumed fixed, F is constant returns to scale1 and R is the fixed return to land. 
Then the value of wealth, W, is given by87 
R W =K+- =K +R(F" 
r 
where r is the rate of interest (return on capital, equal to FiJ so that 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
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If F is, for instance, a unitary elasticity of substitution production function, 
with coefficient on capital of a1 then 
dW =l+-R_l-a (S.4) 
dK Q-R a 
If, for instance, R/Q=.3 and a=.2, then dW/dK=l+l.7=2.7 the increase in 
wealth is more than twice the increase in the productive capital. 
The effect of taxation. If the return to land is taxed, then W and K are rµore 
closely aligned. If the returns to land are fully taxed (as they would be with the 
Henry George tax), Wand K would be fully aligned. This follows directly from 
rewriting (S.2) as 
W =K + (l-r1)R =K+(l-r1)R/F., 
r 
where r1 is the tax rate on the returns to land. 
1.6 Positional goods 
(S.2') 
Similarly, if land serves as a positional good, there can be an increase in the 
value of land, without any increase in the productive potential of the economy. 
Rich individuals compete for houses in the Riviera. As the rich get richer, they 
compete more vigorously for this real estate, and the price of this fixed asset 
increases, without any increase in 11real 11 output. 
Assume there are some assets in fixed supply (positional goods) that do not 
affect production of conventional goods. Assume all the wealth of the econ-
omy is held by the rich (an assumption which does not depart too far from 
reality) and that the demand by rich for these goods is given by M(W, p) with 
the equilibrium given by 
M(W,p)=pT (6.1) 
where pis price of land, T, which is fixed supply, and W=K+pT. For simplicity, 
we choose units so T= l. ( 6.1) can be solved for p as a function of W, and K can 







If the wealth elasticity of the demand for positional goods is large enough and 
the price elasticity is small enough, then an increase in W may even be associ-
ated with a decrease in K. 
The effect of land taxation. As in the previous section, land taxation (and in 
more dynamic models, the taxation of capital gains on land) can help align K 
and W. The demand for positional goods depends not just (or even so much) 
on the price as on the "user cost1' or opportunity cost: M(W, Pi u). The oppor-
tunity cost is r, the return on capital. If there is a land tax1 the cost of owning 
the positional good becomes r+r'p. (In more general dynamic models, where 
the value of land is increasing, the user cost is u =r+p[r 1 -(1-r'')dlog P, 
dt 
where r't is the tax rate on capital gains.) Instead of (6.1) we have (6.1') 
M[w,p,r+p[r 1 -(l-r'')dl~~p]J=p which for fixed expectations about 
capital gains and zero capital gains tax rates can be solved for p as a function 
of K, W, and rL We can then rewrite (6.2) as 
K=W-P(W,K,rL). (6.2') 
At any given K, the higher rL, the lower wealth: the tax reduces the gap between 
wealth and capital.88 
Inequality in wellbeing. While in this and other models in this section, the 
increase in wealth may be largely (or entirely) due to an increase in land val-
ues, one might ask: does this lead to real inequality. After all, the rich consume 
the positional goods. The increase in land values affects them, and them only. 
Workers are only affected to the extent that the increase in land values crowds 
out capital accumulation, so K decreases (or does not increase as much as it 
otherwise would.) 
While this conclusion is true in the simplified model we have constructed 
here1 it is natural that there be a spill over to workers (and in practice, such 
spillovers typically occur.) Assume, for instance, landlords/capitalists rent 
out some of their land to workers, at a rental price of pFx. Then, policies and 
behavior which lead to an increase in pFK disadvantage workers. 
Still, the observation that the increase in land prices (or of other positional 
goods) disproportionately affects the wealthy has several important implications. 
First, it reminds that in making comparisons across different income groups, we 
have to take into account the different market baskets of goods that they con-
sume. The increase in the relative prices of positional goods means that there may 
not have been as large an increase in inequality as would appear to be the case. 89 
Secondly, it helps explain differences in savings behavior both over time 
and across income levels. To achieve 11 success" as demonstrated by acquiring 
expensive positional goods may require more savings (more wealth) today than 
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when the price of such goods were lower. It may be that there is a difference 
between savings out of capital gains1 especially those arising from the increase 
in the value of real estate1 and other returns to capital1 precisely because of the 
consequences of those price changes for acquiring the goods in the future that 
the rich seek to purchase. 
Thirdly, by the same token, patterns of inheritances and life-time giving across 
generations too may be endogenous, affected in particular by such changes. If 
increases in real estate prices make it difficult for even reasonably successful 
workers to purchase a home that they and their parents believe is appropriate to 
their station in life, wealthy parents will provide larger intra vivo transfers. Note 
that, in some sense, the direction of causality has changed: greater wealth and 
wealth inequality arising from an increase in real estate prices has led to greater 
inheritances and intra vivo transfers across generations among the top. 90 
Foreign ownership. The demand by foreigners for positional goods may lead to 
an increase in the wealth of the citizens of a country as well as to an increase in 
wealth inequality. Assume, as above, rentiers own all the positional goods (land 
in the Riviera). A sudden and unanticipated increase in the desire for these 
pieces of land by foreigners increases their value, and the wealth of those who 
happened to own this land; and if those within the country are the wealthy, it 
will contribute to the increase in inequality within the country. (This seems to 
have been a factor increasing inequality within several countries.) 
1. 7 Bubbles: the dynamic instability of the market economy 
Bubbles are a pervasive and recurrent aspect of market economies. While the 
recession may have represented a (/correction," the economy 1nay not have 
fully corrected the price of real estate.91 
Hahn and Shell-Stiglitz92 showed the dynamic instability of the economy 
with heterogeneous capital goods in the absence of a full set of futures markets 
extending infinitely far into the future (or without perfect foresight extending 
infinitely far into the future). The steady state was a saddle point. 
The same result also holds for a model with capital and land (with two 
state variables, K, the stock of capital, and p, the price of land). We extend the 
production function in the straightforward way so that Y=F(K,L,1), where, as 
before, T is the supply of land and L is the supply of labor, and F is constant 
returns to scale. 93 
There is a delicate problem: without growth of the labor force, the equi-
librium interest rate will be zero in the long run in the Kaldor model. 94 But 
at a zero interest rate, if there are positive returns to land1 the value of land 
becomes infinite - in effect, the model breaks down. Assuming labor growth 
(or labor augmenting technological progress) poses its own problems: the land-
labor ratio goes to zero, and under normal assun1ptions about the production 
function, the return to land itself would go off to infinity. This problem can in 
turn be 11solved11 by assuming just the right amount of land-augmenting tech-
nological progress. At first blush, this seems unpersuasive: why should nature 
produce land-augmenting technological progress in just the right amount 
to sustain a steady state. But upon reflection, it may not be so coincidental1 
once we introduce a theory of endogenous factor bias. We know that the bias 
is determined by relative shares, and if the elasticity of substitution is less 
than one,, as land becomes more scarce, there are greater incentives for land-
augmenting technological progress. 95 
We investigate two alternative approaches. The first entails assuming a con-
ventional production function (without land), but the existence of land as a 
store of value. The second assumes a fixed rate of land augmenting technologi-
cal change, equal to n. 
1.7.1 Non-productive land96 
The key equilibrium condition is that the return to holding land and capital 
must be the same1 i.e. since land is non-productive, its entire return is its 
capital gain, ~(log p), and the equilibrium condition is 
dt 
(7.1) 
whereµ is the depreciation rate and FK is the gross return to capital. 
The short-run dynamics are described by (7.1) and 
(7.2) 
where we have assumed that only capitalists save and they save a fixed frac-
tion1 s1 of ufull net income 11 including capital gains (Shell1 Sidrauski, and 
Stiglitz, 1969).97 The RHS of (7.2) is net savings (as seen by the individual, not 
according to the national income accounts). This goes into an increase in the 
value of land (11 land savings") or capital accumulation. 
Substituting (7.1) into (7.2), we obtain (again using the normalization that 
T=l): 
dK dp 
- = s(FJ(K -µK)-(1- s)- = (sJ< -(1- s)p)(FK - µ) 
dt dt 
(7.3) 
(7.3) and (7.1) provide a pair of differential equations fully describing the 
dynamics of the economy. 






Figure 1.3 Steady states and dynamics with non-productive land: linear savings 





We define K* as the value of K solving (7.4a). Note that any value of p along 
K=K* is an equilibrium, since dK/dt=O when K=K* (net income of capitalists 
is zero). 
The dynamics are easy to describe and are also depicted in Figure 1.3: To 
the right of K=K*, p is decreasing (the net return to capital is negative) and 
to the left it is increasing. Above the dK/dt=O locus, but to the left of K*, K is 
decreasing, while above the dK/dt=O locus, to the right of K*, K is increasing. 
Conversely, below the dK/dt=O locus, but to the left of K*, K is increasing, while 
below the dK/dt=O locus, to the right of K*, K is decreasing. 
Let p*=sK*/(1-s). K* in combination of any value of P<P* is a stable equilib-
rium; K* and any value of p"?.p* is an unstable equilibrium. The saddle point 
trajectory EE* divides the bottom quadrant (below dK/dt=O and to the left 
of K*) into a convergent and non-convergent region. Below EE*, paths con-
verge to K=K*. Above EE*, they diverge. As a trajectory below the dK/dt locus 
and to the left of K* approaches K*, the slope is 
dp p 
dK"' sK-(1-s)p (7.5) 
which is finite below the locus p=sK/(1-s). Hence, trajectories hit the vertical 
axis, at which point they remain in the steady state. We can similarly show that 
if K0 >K*, K will also hit K; but if the initial value of p>sK/(1-s), K will initially 
increase, before decreasing to K*. 
Thus, there are an infinity of stable equilibria, in all of which the level of 
income is the same1 but in which there can be markedly different values of 
wealth (K+pT). pT is in this sense fully indeterminate. But if K<K* and the 
initial price is too high, the economy experiences a bubble. 
A generalized savings {Unction. These results are partly a consequence of the 
special savings function employed. More generally, we assume 
dK+dp_s(K dpJ 
dt dt - 'p, dt ' (7.6) 
Net savings are a function of capital, the value of land, and capital gains. 
Kand p affect savings both because they increase the income and wealth of the 
individual. This formulation recognizes1 however, that aggregate savings may 
differ depending on the composition of wealth (i.e. it is not necessarily just a 
function of K+pT, aggregate wealth). This may be because the risk properties of 
these assets differ or the individuals who own these assets differ. 
With this formulation, the dynamics are described by (7.1) and 
(7.7) 
There are two possible (sets of) steady states. One is given by the solution to 
(7.4a) and98 
s(K*,p*,0)=0. (7.8) 
If we assume (at dp/dt=O), Sx>O and sp>O (in the absence of capital gains, 
an increase in wealth of any form leads to increased savings), then (at least 
near K=K*) the dK/dt=O is downward sloping. The dynamics are unstable 
(Figure l.4a), and maybe oscillatory, as illustrated in Figure l.4b.99 Even though 





Figure 1.4a Unstable dynamics with non-productive land and non-linear savings 
function 
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Figure 1.4b Oscillatory dynamics with non-productive land and non-linear savings 
function 
if the :1~~o locus hits the vertical axis, then the dynamics are constrained. 
dt 
0-SK-SK'' where K" is defined by f(K**)=µK" (i.e. the capital stock that would 
result if the savings rate were unity.) pis non-negative. We can trace out a sin-
gle oscillation along the path that begins say at K=K* and p very small. Such 
a path cannot hit the K** boundary or the horizontal axis. If the value of p 
when it returns to K* is lower than the initial p, then subsequent oscillations 
are arbitrarily close to t11e initial oscillation. If the value of p when it returns to 
K' is greater than the initial p, all paths must be contained within the bound 
defined by this oscillation, a straightforward implication of which is that there 
must be a limit cycle.100 
The second possible steady state is defined by p=O and s(K'",0,0)=0. (Recall 
that dp = p(FK -µ) so that dp = o for p=O for all finite values of Feµ.) If s,>0, 
dt dt 
so long asp is constrained to be zero, the dynamics are stable. But if p is ever 
perturbed above zero, the dynamics described earlier become applicable. 
1. 7 .2 Land-augmenting technological change 
In this section, we assume that land is productive and the effective land supply 
increases at the rate n. The equation describing the equalization of returns to 
land and capital now takes on the form 
d In steady state, -(logp) = n. 
dt 
(7.9) 
Because the rate of land-augmenting technical progress is n1 one unit of land 
becomes more valuable over time at the rate n. We define 
(7.10) 
so that 
d d Fe-"' 
-(logq) =-(1ogp)-n = FK--'--n dt dt q (7.11) 
Redefining units so that TA is a unit of effective land, and denoting (as before) 
as output per unit effective labor, fT'=FT'=FTe-"1• Then the capital arbitrage 
equation can be rewritten 
d d fr' 
-(logq) = -(logp)-n = (, ---n dt dt q (7.12) 
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To simplify our analysis, for the remainder of this section we assume µ=0 and 
we assume that a constant fraction of all income (including capital gains) is 
saved. We can write (7.2) as 
d (l K) pT d (l )- (F(K,L, T) T dp) 
- og +-- ogp -S +--
dt Kdt K Kdt 
(7.14) 
or in our normalized units 
!!_(log k) =/Ck) (1-s)(qf, - fr,) - n 
dt k k 
(7.14') 
The steady state is given by the solution to the loci along which dq/dt=O and 
dk/dt=O, given respectively by101 
and 




<P'>O provided only that 
(7.15) 
(7.16) 
Under natural restrictions, the limit of <Jl as k goes to zero is zero, and as k goes 
to k** is infinity. In Figure 1.51 we have drawn the curve as upward sloping.102 
Above the curve, q is increasing; below it is decreasing. 
'1'(0)=0 under natural restrictions. Again, under natural restrictions, for 
large enough k, the numerator of (7.16) becomes negative. Define k*' as the 
solution to103 
sf(k") +(1-s)f r-=nk'* (7.17) 
q 
k 
Figure 1.5 Steady state and unstable dynamics with land~augmenting technical change 
Hence 'I' is the inverted U shaped locus depicted in Figure 1.5. It is easy to show 
that the <!>locus cuts the 'I' locus from below and there is a unique equilibrium. 
Above the locus, dk/dt is negative, below it is positive. 
If land prices are too high1 for ownership of land to generate the same returns 
as capital, the price of land has to increase. On the other hand1 if q is above 
both the dk/dt=O locus and the dp/dt=O locus, it means that the increase in 
the value of land C' savings" in this sense) acts as a substitute for real capital 
accumulation, and k accordingly diminishes. The result is that the steady state 
equilibrium is a saddle point, as depicted in the figure. 
With futures markets extending infinitely far into the future, q is set along 
the trajectory converging to the steady state, that is, there is a unique value of 
q for each k such that the economy converges to the steady state. 
Without futures markets extending infir1itely far into the future or infinite 
foresight, there is no reason to believe that the transversality condition will be 
satisfied. But along the paths which satisfy the short run arbitrage equation 
but do not converge to the long run equilibrium because the initial price is too 
high, the price of land eventually increases super exponentially.104 As a result, 
in finite time, the 11bubble11 will be 11 corrected. 11 But it can be a long time. And 
even when there is a "correction/' it may still be on a "bubble path. 11 The price 
of land falls, but to a level still above the convergent path. 
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Note that on the trajectories in which the price of land 11explodes111 eventu~ 
ally the increase in the value of land crowds out capital accumulation - the 
capital stock declines, even though wealth continues to increase. Indeed, as k gets 
small, virtually all of wealth is in the value of land, and thus wealth increases 
at the rate of n +_cl_(log q) = n + f, - fr' . Above the dq/dt=O locus, qlk>fr' so that 
dt q 
wealth is unambiguously increasing (and even increasing per capita). Indeed 
the wealth-income ratio (as usually defined, where income ignores capital 
gains) goes off to infinity. 
Taxation. We now ask, what happens when we impose taxation on capital 
gains and/or the returns to land. The capital arbitrage equation now becomes 
(l-t'') dp = pFK -FT(l-t") 
dt 
(7.9') 
In steady state, the price of land is going up at the rate n, so in the steady state 
(using our normalized units) 
Or 
fr-(l-t') 
q= f,-(l-t'')n (7.13') 
To complete the analysis, we need to specify what is done with the revenues 
raised by the tax. Assume that they are entirely spent on consumption. Then 
the capital accumulation equation becomes 
d f(k) (l-s)(l-t'')(qf,-(l-t')fr) 
-(logk) = s n, 
dt k k 
so in steady state 
q 




The steady state is given by the solution to (7.13') and (7.16'), giving the 
locus of dq/dt=O and dk/dt=O with land and capital gains taxes. From (7.13') 
the land tax lowers the dq/dt=O locus, but leaves the dk/dt=O locus unchanged. 
As Figure 1.6a shows, this means that an increase in a tax on the return to 
land leads to an increase in the capital-labor ratio and an increase in wages, 
validating the common presumption that savings diverted into land invest-
ment (or speculation) is money that could otherwise have gone into real 
investment. 
A tax on capital gains shifts both curves upwards, and as Figure 1.6b shows1 
the consequence is again that the equilibrium capital-labor ratio increases. 
(The effect on the price of land is more ambiguous in the case of a tax on 
capital gains; along the dk/dt=O curve, at any k, a higher tax on capital gains 
has to be offset by a high price of land, and by itself this would have implied 
a higher equilibrium q. But at the same time, this is partially offset by the shift 
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On the other hand1 if the revenues are spent on investment1 then 
dk 
- = sf(k)-(1- s)(l-t'') qn + t''qn + t'fr• - nk, 
dt 




Relative to the previous equilibrium, the dk/dt=O curve is shifted up even more 
(while the dq/dt=O curve is unchanged), so that the equilibrium value of k is 
increased even more. 
1.8 Credit, collateral, and wealth inequality 
We have argued that much of the growth of wealth is associated with the 
increased value of land and other fixed assets. Land, and certain other assets, 
have one attribute which makes them particularly attractive: they can be µsed 
as coilateral. The fact that they can be used as collateral may increase their 
value; but the value associated with the ability to be used as collateral will 
depend on the financial system. If, for instance, banks do no lending based on 
collateral, then the 11 collateral value" will be zero; the easier access to credit for 
those who have collateral, the higher these assets will be valued. 
Moreover, the demand for land and other assets depends itself on the avail-
ability of credit - a fact that was made abundantly clear by recent experiences 
with Quantitative Easing. (Indeed, one of the rationales for quantitative easing, 
and one of the main channels for its claimed success, was that it led to higher 
asset prices, with the hope that the increased wealth would in turn lead to 
more consumption.) 
In this section, we suggest that the system by which credit is provided may 
be one of the main sources of wealth and income inequality: if a favored 
few get access to credit, tl1en their wealth increases relative to those with-
out such access. Nowhere was this clearer than in the former Soviet Union, 
where bank licenses were granted to some politically connected individu-
als. The access to funds that this provided enabled them to acquire state 
assets as they were being privatized; the limited access to funds meant that 
competition was limited and they could acquire the state assets at far below 
fair market value. 
In a less dramatic way, wealth inequality in the United States and other 
advanced countries may also be linked with the financial system. If much 
of the growth of wealth is related to an increase in credit (or other changes 
in the financial system); if access to credit is based on collateral; and if the 
assets which have benefited from the increase in credit (or other changes in 
the financial system) are disproportionately owned by the rich, then it should 
be apparent that th~se increases in credit and other changes in the financial 
system may have played a major role in the increase in wealth and income 
inequality. 
Our system of credit creation may perversely create not only inequality at 
the top, but also at the bottom. It persuades the poor to borrow beyond their 
ability, and then charges them usurious interest rates. Changes in bankruptcy 
laws making it ever harder to discharge debts create a system of partial indebted 
servitude. Struggling to survive, they have no ability to make investments 
that would help them emerge fro1n such poverty, and indeed, even to think 
long term. In the models below, we ignore these effects, focusing on the link 
between credit, collateral, land, and capital accumulation. 
1.8.1 Credit and the value of land as a positional good 
In this section, we provide a bare-bones model that we think may capture more 
accurately what has been going on than any of the models presented so far: the 
banking system provides credit based on collateral. When the price of land in 
the Riviera goes up, the banks are willing to lend more. If the banks are willing 
to lend more, the price of land in the Riviera goes up. There is, essentially, an 
indeterminacy: it is the decision of the banks (the central bank) concerning 
credit availability that drives the price of land (real estate). 
We modify the model of section 2 by assuming three distinct classes of 
individuals - workers who just consume, capitalists who save out of profits, 
own enterprises and invest only in capital goods, but have no access to credit, 
and rentiers, who own land. 106 Their demand for positional good (land in the 
Riviera) is given by M(WT,c,p), with the equilibrium condition now being 
given by 
M(WT,c,p)=pT= WT +c, (8.1) 
where c is the amount of credit that is available and wr is the wealth of the 
rentier, which is just the value of the land minus what they owe in credit: 
WT =pT-c. Substituting into (8.1) we obtain 
M[w,. WT +c)-wT ,c,--~ - +c T (8.1') 
We can solve for 
p=1ji(C) (8.2) 
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The wealth of the rentiers is entirely driven by the provision of credit 
WT =pT-e = T1J!(e)-e (8.3) 
To close the model, we need an additional equation describing capital accu-
mulation. We take the simplest version, due to Kaldor (1957).1°' Capitalists-
entrepreneurs save a fraction of their income, sP1 putting their money into 
capital goods 
dK dt = s,rK -µK, (8.4) 
where µ is the depreciation rate, so in steady state 
(8.5) 
Jn this model, the provision of additional credit has no effect on the equilib-
rium capital stock. We thus obtain from (8.1'), letting W= WT +K, the sum of 
the wealth of the rentiers and the capitalists, 
dW dW1 -(1-M, -M,JT) 
= de de 1-Mw, -M,IT 
(8.6) 
An increase in credit increases wealth through an increase in land prices, 
but has no effect on the capital stock. Since it is only the wealthy who own 
the land and that get access to credit, all of the increase in wealth (capital 
gain) goes to the wealthy. Monetary policy causes both the increase in (non-
productive) wealth and the increase in wealth inequality. But while wealth has 
increased1 wages are unaffected. Note that in this model, since credit simply 
leads to asset price increases (and an increase in the price only of the fixed 
asset land) - but not commodity price increases - there is no reason that a 
monetary authority focusing on commodity price inflation would circum-
scribe credit creation. 
1.8.2 Credit and the creation of land bubbles and inequality 
In this section, we consider a simple extension of the model of section 3 to 
incorporate credit, with land-augmenting teclmological progress at the rate n. 
To simplify, we assume that land and capital goods are perfect substitutes for 
each other, that there is no consumption value to land, and there are not two 
separate classes of entrepreneurs and rentiers. Land and capital are simply 
alternative stores of value, and in equilibrium they must yield the same return. 
Then, as before, 
!!:__(logq)+ fr = f,-n. 
dt q 
(8.7) 
Moreover1 the full income of capitalists is now FK(pT+K) 1 so that capital accu-
mulation is described by (as before, letting P denote the effective land per 
worker, which is fixed, and assuming for simplicity that µ =0) 
dk + T'(qf, - f.) = s,(f,(T' + k) + T'(qf, - fr· ))-n. dt r (8.8) 
As before, (8. 7) and (8.8) describe the full dynamics of the economy in terms 
of {q, k). 
Now assume, however, that the banking system108 only provides credit with 
land as collateral, but provides it at zero interest rate1 so that owners of land 
borrow as much as they can. The central bank limits the amount of credit that 
is made available. As more credit is provided, the price of land will be bid up, 
and in equilibrium 
c=apT. (8.9) 







-(logq) = -(logc)-n. dt dt (8.11) 
There is a path of expansion of the credit supply which ensures that (8.8) is 
satisfied. If the financial system expands credit supply at a pace that is faster 
than that implied by (8.8) and (8.10), the return to land will exceed the return 
to capital. In this polar model1 if this were anticipated, no one would want to 
hold capital. The price of capital goods would fall below 1, and the production 
of capital would halt. k would decrease with the increase in the population. We 
then replace 8.7 with 
!!:_(log q) +fr• = f, + dlog z/dt 
dt q z 
(8.12) 
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where z is the price of capital goods in terms of consumption goods; and 
d 
-(logk) = -n. dt 
(8.13) 
k decreases and q increases. 109 If c increases fast enough, the value of wealth 
increases, and even wealth per capita increases1 even though the capital stock 
per capita is decreasing. 
Note that along such a trajectory the ratio of the (full) income of capitalists 
to that of workers will be increasing, provided that the elasticity of substitution 




where YK is the (full) income of capital and Y, that of labor. Note too that while 
the value of wealth is increasing, the return to capital will be increasing and 
that to labor decreasing. Hence trajectories where there is a rapid expansion of 
credit shift the income distribution towards capitalists. Of course1 on such tra-
jectories1 growth in output will be low, in spite of the rapid increase in wealth. 
This simple model is consistent with the stylized facts described in Part 1 of this 
paper. (Note that while the ratio of full income of capitalists to that of workers 
is increasing, the ratio of income in the national income accounts to that of 
workers will be decreasing if the elasticity of substitution is less than one.)110 
In n1ore general models1 where there is not a linear production possibilities 
frontier, an increase in credit leading to an increase in the value of land can 
initially lead to more investment, but eventually an increasing proportion of 
savings is absorbed by increases in the value of land1 and, as here - and evidently 
as in many countries - the rate of real capital accumulation diminishes. 
1.8.3 Credit creation, monetary policy, and inequality 
To see more precisely how the "rules of the game 11 on credit creation can affect 
the distribution of wealth, first consider the model of the previous subsection, 
where credit is provided at a low rate against land as collateral. The return to 
holding land Pr is then the capital gain on land, the yield on land, and the 
option that owning land provides to get access to capital at a low rate:11 1 
Pr= (1 +a)FK =(l +a)(_:l_(logp)+ FTJ dt p (8.15) 
where here owning a dollar's worth of land allows one to borrow enough to 
increase one's land holdings to (l+a)1 on each unit of which one obtains 
he 
a return equal to the return on capital. In equilibrium, the return to land must 
equal the return to capital, and this means that if there is a change in the 
rules of the game - say a lowering of the collateral required for a loan - then 
there will be an increase in the price of land: those who are lucky enough to 
own land at that moment receive a large capital gain.112 Such a change could 
be motivated by an improvement in the ability to manage risk, or by politi-
cal influence, with the financial industry persuading politicians that such a 
change would allow a more efficient capital market. Of course1 such a change 
in the regulations regarding lending does not increase the amount of real 
resources available in the economy1 even if it might allow banks to lend more1 
and thereby might increase the profitability of banking. 113 
A slight variation of the life cycle model of Part Ill allows us to explore in 
more detail some of the distributive consequences of such a change or simi-
larly, of a change in monetary policy that resulted in lower lending rates. Here, 
we investigate these issues in a highly stylized model that provides insights 
into the natural reasons that the ownership of land or other assets that might 
be used for collateral should be concentrated at the top. The issues can be seen 
more clearly in the context of a model where we assume only two factors of 
production, capital and labor, and that the ownership of capital ("equity in 
capital") can be used for collateral. 
Assume that workers are very risk averse1 while the wealthier capitalists are 
(close to) risk neutral. We assume that the government issues a fixed number 
of bonds B; each bond pays a fixed (real) interest rate, r,, which is controlled 
by the government (monetary authority). We assume that the returns to 
capital are variable, so that all the capital is owned by the capitalists (they 
are the owners of equity), and all government bonds are owned by work-
ers. Again, for simplicity, we assume that capitalists save and reinvest all of 
their gross income.The price of the bond is n. Thus the real rate of return to 
holding a bond is r, . Because of risk aversion, r, can be substantially below 
n n 
E(FK), the expected return on capital, and workers will still hold their wealth 
in government bonds. On the other hand, so long as r/r' is less than E(FK) no 
capitalist will hold a government bond. The price of the bond adjusts so that 
all of workers' savings is held in bonds,114 i.e. assuming a constant savings rate 
of s out of wages (net of taxes). If workers pay no taxes, then 
Bn=sw (8.16) 
Interest on government bonds is financed through taxation. Not surprisingly, 
the structure of taxation matters. 
Assume for simplicity that interest payments to workers are financed 
through a lump-sum tax -r: on workers, i.e. rg B=r. It can be shown that 
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SW 
equilibrium requires n=l 1115 i.e. B=-1---. Now, a change in rg financed by +srg 
a tax on labor leaves the returns to capital unchanged, 116 and that means that 
K* is unchanged and w is unchangedi but it necessitates a change in B and r. 
In particular, it can be shown that an increase in rg leads to an increase in -r .117 
It thus leads to decreased first period consumption, but to increased second 
period consumption. 118 Since across steady states, C1 +C2=w, the steady~state 
utility of workers is maximized at r,=O (when in effect individuals face the 
same constraint).119 
In this model, the T bill rate is totally divorced from the rate-of return on 
capital. We can, however, link the two, by assuming that the government, 
while borrowing from workers (who are engaged in life-cycle savings), is willing 
to lend to capitalists at a rate that is equal to or greater than that rate. For sim-
plicity1 we assume that there is a single rate1 but that the government rations 
the amount it is willing to lend to capitalists, since so long as rg<FK, risk-neutral 
capitalists will want to borrow as much as possible. The way it rations credit is 
to require collateral. Hence1 if a unit of capital allows a firm to borrow a, the 
overall return to a dollar of accumulation is FK(l+a)-ar_,. 
In the short run, a lowering of 'i leads to an increase in the net income of 
capitalists by an amount proportional to aK* and a reduction of the income 
of life-cycle savers/workers by a corresponding amount. It is, in effect, a direct 
transfer from workers (life cycle savers) to capitalists. 
Note that in this model, the distributive consequences of a lowering of the 
interest rate are the opposite of that derived in conventional 11 class 11 analysis, 
where workers are seen as debtors and capitalists as creditors. In that model, 
a lowering of the interest rate hurts capitalists and helps workers. Here, work-
ers and capitalists are both owners of capital, but different kinds of capital. 
A lowering of the interest rate helps owners of equity and hurts those who \laid 
government debt. This model seems to be a better description of the modern 
economy, and in this model, lowering interest rates unambiguously contrib-
utes to growing inequality. (This model, however, abstracts from Keynesian 
aggregate demand effects, which are the central motivation in lowering interest 
rates. We have assumed a full employment neoclassical economy.) 
Over the long run, with a fixed, a lowering of rg increases the return to invest-
ing, implying a higher equilibrium value of K, 120 and a higher wage rate, from 
which workers gain. The long-run equilibrium condition is (continuing with 
our simplifying assumption of sv=l) 
. (8.17) 
Moreover, as rg is lowered, they gain also from the lowering of r. But once rg 
is lowered below zero, there is an offsetting distortion in the intertemporal 
l 
pattern of consumption. This means that there is (from workers' long run wel-
fare perspective) an optimal rg<o.121 
Inequality in wealth is given hy sw/K; and it is possible to describe how this 
changes with a change in rg- 122 For very large elasticities of substitution, the 
increase in K has little effect on w, so inequality increases; while for small elas-
ticities of demand, the increase in K increases wages significantly1 and reduces 
inequality. 
Who gets the rents associated with credit creation? The essential insight of this 
analysis is that differences between life cycle savers and capitalists affect the 
asset composition of their holdings1 and this means that policy changes (tax, 
monetary, and regulatory policies) affecting the relative returns and prices of 
differeut assets have differential effects on the two groups. 
A natural question is, can't the process of credit allocation be changed to 
ensure that the rents associated with access to credit that are effectively being 
given the owners of capital through credit creation are more fairly shared? Why 
not have an auction of credit, so there won't be any rents? 
Part of the answer is provided by the theory of information asymmetries: 
Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and a large subsequent literature have explained why the 
provision of credit cannot be auctioned. There l1as to be an allocation process, 
entailing judgments about who is most likely to repay. But if that is the case, 
then who controls the allocation process makes a difference. Because it is a 
difficult task, entailing difficult judgments, it is natural that it be entrusted to 
those who are better educated, to the elites. But the elites are better judging 
those that are similar to themselves; there is an additional element of risk in 
judging those that are different. Moreover, there are shared judgments about 
risks and values. Not surprisingly, then, they allocate capital to those that are 
similar to themselves - even when and where connected lending is prohib-
ited; and, of course, even more so when connected lending is allowed. In this 
manner, inequality builds on itself. 
But that doesn't mean tl1at there aren't excessive rents built into the financial 
system, and not just through the abuses that have been especially well-docu-
mented in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, based on market exploitation (see, 
for example, Stiglitz, 2010). Consider, for instance, the allocation of credit for 
mortgages. Today, such allocation is not based on judgment so much as credit 
scoring. It is an information intensive process, involving the processing of 
information about the incomes of the borrower and the values of the proper-
ties being acquired. But government entities have the best data, and the gov-
ernment is in the best position to enforce the debt contract: the government, 
through the income tax system, has a complete histmy of income, and through 
property registries, of real estate transaction prices. The incremental cost of col-
lecting mortgage payments through the income tax system is negligible. Indeed, 
it could easily construct a system of income contingent mortgage loans that 
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would be far better than the current system.123 Administrative costs for such 
a system are likely to be very low, so that mortgages could be provided at an 
interest rate only slightly greater than that paid on government debt. The huge 
rents (and the associated instability and inequality) of the private mortgage sys-
tem could be greatly reduced, and the enormous waste of resources as financial 
institutions look for fools upon whom they can prey would also be reduced. 
1.9 Concluding remarks 
This paper has attempted to explain key stylized facts about changes in mac-
roeconomic variables, including those describing changes in the distribution 
of income and wealth, within models in which there is micro- and macro-
consistency. Among the key findings are: 
• Standard data on savings cannot be reconciled with the increase in the 
wealth-income ratio: there is a wealth residual. That is, observed increases in 
wealth and wealth-income ratios cannot be explained by the steady process 
of the accumulation of capital. 
• An important component of the "wealth residuar' is associated with an 
increase in rents: land rents, exploitation rents - including those associ-
ated with information asymmetries, monopoly and other forms of market 
power - and returns on intellectual property. Any theory attempting to 
explain the evolution of the economy must thus focus on explaining the 
increase in rents and their capitalized value, which are an increasingly 
important share of overall wealth. 
• Concepts of "capital" and 11wealth 11 are distinct. Appropriately defined 
aggregates for the inputs into production and wealth may be move in oppo-
site directions. The productive capacity of the economy may thus not increase in 
tandem with measured wealth. Indeed, in many economies (including the US), 
productive capacity may be falling even as wealth is increasing. An increase 
in the market value of land does not make the economy more productive. 
An increase in wealth as a result of increased monopoly power, or political 
power which transfers resources from the public to corporations (for exam-
ple, through corporate welfare) may even reduce the productive capacities 
of the economy. 
• This resolves some long-standing paradoxes: the fundamental law of dimin-
ishing returns says that an increase in wealth should lead to a lowering of 
the return to capital. But, in fact, because real wealth - what might be called 
11 real capital11 or "productive capital11 - has not increased in tandem with 
measured wealth, there is no necessity that the return to capital would fall as 
measured wealth increases. 
• Similarly, we would expect an increase in wealth to be associated with 
an increase in average wages. This would be true even with technological 
change (even if it is "skill-biased") or if there is a change in the composition 
of the labor force. The large gap that has opened up between the growth in 
appropriately measured average wages and productivity is consistent with 
the hypothesis that there has been an increase in market power. 
• The increase in market power and other forms of exploitation rents can be 
in part explained by changes in technology and changes in institutional, 
legal, and economic structures. 
• The paper provides several models (including life cycle models where land 
is a store of value or is a positional good) to explain why land values typi-
cally increase as wealth and wealth inequality increase: the wedge between 
wealth and real capital increases. 
• The economy is dynamically unstable; that is, it is prone to the kinds of 
bubbles that have marked the economy in recent years. Particularly on such 
bubble paths, the increase in land values (wealth held in the form of land) 
crowds out real productive investment. Thus1 the poor performance of the 
American economy - when employment, the growth of output, wages, 
median wealth and income, and other indicators are considered - should 
not come as a surprise. 
In short, this paper gives the theoretical underpinnings explaining why, in recent 
decades, wages have stagnated while GDP and productivity have continued to grow. 
It explains not only wage stagnation, but also credit-fueled bubbles. There has not 
been growth in productive capital relative to GDP (especially when controlling for 
increases in the value of real estate). The growth in wealth is for the most part simply 
the growth in the capitalized value of rents. This growth in rents has a negative effect 
on societal wellbeing. 
The paper also has explored key determinants in wealth distribution, focus-
ing in particular on the distribution between life cycle savers and u capitalists." 
A marked change in the structure of the economy over the last 75 years has 
been the increase in life-cycle savings. We derive a simple formula describing 
the relative share of inherited wealth: 
k"" _ s(k*) 1-S, 
---n-----
k* SP Sk 
(where n is the rate of growth, s(k*) is the savings rate of workers, and sP that 
of capitalists, and Sk the share of capital): In general, the wealth and income 
of capitalists will not continually increase relative to the rest of the economy1 
though in moving from one equilibrium to another, there can be marked 
increases. The magnitude of wealth inequality does not in general depend 
on the difference between the rate of return on capital or the rate of inter-
est (r) and the rate of growth. The rate of return on capital is an endogenous 
variable, and needs to be related to underlying parameters of behavior and 
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technology (which the above formula does.) The analysis also notes that 
workers' savings does not (in this model) lead to higher wages or incomes per 
capita, but simply crowds out capitalists1 savings. Introducing land into the 
standard neoclassical life cycle n1odel lowers the equilibrium share of workers' 
wealth: wealth holdings in the form of land crowd out, in effect, productive 
savings. 
We have also noted the ability of the financial system to exploit life-cycle 
savers, by lowering the return they receive on their assets relative to those 
received by the wealthy; this naturally decreases the share of wealth owned by 
life-cycle savers. 
We have suggested, moreover, that there may be no fundamental difference 
between capitalists and workers: they may have the same savings function, with 
differences in savings rate simply reflecting differences in their wealth. It is 
not because workers save little that they have little wealth to pass on to their 
children; it is because they have little inherited wealth that they have a low 
savings. History matters: there can exist different steady states, depending on 
initial conditions. 
In related work (Stiglitz, 2015), we have analyzed the distribution of wealth 
among capitalists. 124 The wealth distribution is the result of a balancing out of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces, forces pulling the economy apart and bring-
ing it together. Increases in inequality can be attributed to the strengthening 
of centrifugal forces and the weakening of centripetal forces. Examples of 
strengthened centrifugal forces include the lowering of taxes at the top, the 
spending of more on the education of the children of the rich than of the poor, 
and increased dispersion of the returns to capital. An example of a weakening 
of centripetal forces is the weakening of public education. We are able to derive 
a simple formula describing the level of inequality in wealth among the very 
rich (the Pareto coefficient). It is related to the share of capital, the level of 
taxation of capital, and the degree of progressivity (or regressivity) of capital 
taxation. Again, because the return to capital is endogenous, the degree of ine-
quality in the long-run equilibrium is not related to the difference between the 
growth of the economy and the return to capital. Moreover, just as the increase 
in wealth cannot be explained within the standard economic model, 11either 
can the increase in wealth inequality. Once again, it is changes in policies, not 
economics, that are driving what is happening. 
Our analysis provides a number of insights into how policies can affect 
inequality: 
• Policies that reduce rents and their capitalized value can reduce inequality 
and increase economic performance. Efficiency and equity imply that rents 
should be taxed at very high rates; and taxes on capital with appropriate loss 
offset provisions actually encourage risk taking. 
... 
• Capital taxation has to be carefully designed to avoid problems of shifting 
(where before-tax returns increase, so that after-tax returns are not lowered). 
Progressive capital taxation with proceeds at least partially spent on public 
investments can reduce inequality and increase national output. 
• A land (real estate) tax and a tax on natural resources - a generalized 
He11ry George tax - can succeed not only in reducing inequality but can 
also lead to higher national output. (Since investments in land crowd out 
real investment, the lowered value of land as a result of taxation crowds in 
real investment.) 
• Given the large amount of life-cycle savings, the traditional division of 
society into the owners of capital and workers or creditors and debtors may 
no longer provide the most insights for understanding the impact of poli-
cies on distribution. The relevant division is between capitalists1 who pass 
on their wealth from generation to generation, and workers, who save for 
their retirement, and between the owners of equity and the holders of debt 
instruments. Since the wealthy are disproportionately the holders of equity, 
a lowering of interest rates (as in quantitative easing) benefits them but 
hurts holders of government bonds, disproportionately life-cycle savers, and 
thus increases inequality. 
• We show the links between the increases in land values1 monetary policies, 
and the structure and conduct of the financial system1 demonstrating how 
changes in the rules governing that sector and the conduct of monetary 
authorities may increase inequality. A lowering of collateral requirements or 
of banks' capital adequacy requirements does not result in an increase in the 
overall efficiency of the economy, but leads to more inequality.125 
In short, a tax on rents can raise revenue, not only incentivizing more productive 
investment, but also ensuring that more of society's scarce savings go into such 
productive investments, thereby enhancing growth and reducing inequality. 
The deficiencies of the neoclassical model in explaining inequality that we 
have noted should make us wary about using that model for policy purposes -
either for addressing inequality or for broader issues of economic performance. 
That model cannot account well for changes in inequality; we cannot explain 
these changes solely in terms of changes in the underlying key parameters that 
have traditionally been the focus of attention, related to technology and behav-
ior, such as savings rates1 bequest behavior, and reproduction rates, and the 
differences among families with respect to these variables. 
For more than two centuries, there has been an attempt to break away from a 
feudal system in which a child's position in society is preordained by that of his 
parent1 and to move to a meritocratic system where it is determined by the child1s 
own ability. In many respects we have succeeded, but perhaps not as much as we 
had hoped: the evidence is that even in a society like the United States avowedly 
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committed to meritocracy, inherited advantages play a key role, and more thqn a 
role than can be explained by the process of transmission of genes. 
We should be concerned with wealth inequality, however it is genera\ed, 
because societies in which there are large wealth (and income) inequalities func-
tion differently from more equalitarian societies. There are social and political 
consequences. It is worth noting that the attack on monopolies and trusts in the 
Progressive era was more motivated by concerns about their political and social 
consequences than the market distortions to which they gave rise. 
Because so much of the increase in inequality in income and wealth is related 
to changes in policies, changes in those policies may be able to ameliorate this 
growing inequality. If we believe that there are large costs to our econo:rny, 
our democracies, and our societies from this growing inequality, then at the 
very least, we should ask, are there changes in policy which will slow dpwn 
this increase in inequality - and perhaps reverse it. An understanding of the 
forces that may be contributing to the growing inequality, such as that we have 
attempted to provide here, is a first step in constructing such a policy ageµda. 
In fact, a long list of policy changes - changes in legal frameworks, taxes, 
and expenditures - which would lead to Jess inequality in both the short run 
and the long which might do this, and simultaneously increase economic 
performance, has already been identified.126 It is not the lack of knowledge 
that is preventing these actions from being undertaken. It is politics, a politics 
shaped by inequality of political power which follows from and can amplify 
inequalities in economic power. 127 The growing inequality in our society is 
thus a reflection as much of democracy in the twenty-first century as it is of 
capitalism in the twenty-first century. 
The fact that inequality is not just, or perhaps even mostly, the result of 
inexorable economic forces but of policies should be a source of hope: for it 
holds out the possibility that alternative policies might change the directions 
in which advanced economies seem to be heading. And it makes all the more 
imperative the research agenda to which this paper hopefully has made a con-
tribution, of trying to understand better the determinants of the equilibrium 
wealth and income distribution. 
Appendix A: Proof that average wages should increase with 
capital deepening 
Assume Y=F(K, Lv L21 ... ) is constant returns to scale. In the following discussion, we 
will simplify and assume only two types of labor. Constant returns to scale (CRTS) 
implies that 
so 
Diminishing returns implies FKK<O, which is why if there is only one type of labor 
FLK>O: an increase in capital must increase the marginal productivity of labor1 so that 
an increase in capital (relative to labor) must increase the wage. Here, it is clear that the 
wage of one of the two types of labor could go down. 
But consider the average wage1 W: 
whereL=L1 +L2• 
The weighted average wage must increase when capital (the capital labor ratio) is increased. 
This result is strengthened if we assume that there is an increase in the quality of the 
labor force. Let w be the proportion of high skilled workers. 128 Then 
dw _JK dw 
-=WK-+(F1 ~Fi.,)->0. dt dt' dt 
Appendix B: Relationship between change in wealth 
and aggregate inputs 
Consider the rate of change of wealth, W=K+pT: 
dlog(W) ~I' dlog(K) +(I-Odlog(p) 
dt ·at dt 
where it will be recalled 
~=K/W. 
But 
p= [(!-()/(] K/T, 
so, substituting into (B.2), we obtain~=( so that 













_d_t_ = -d-t -, 
Appendix C: Inheritance taxes 
(B.6) 
In this appendix, we analyze the effects of taxing only the return on inherited wealth. 
Life cycle savings is exempted, e.g. through IRA accounts. Now, we have a somewhat 




Substituting (C. l) into (C.2), we obtain 
k'" = s(k')(w(k')+r'f'(k')k') 




We have already shown that as rt increases w(k*)+'ff(k*) decreases. Similarly, as re 
increases the denominator increases. Hence, so long as s':?:O, kw* decreases. k* decreases. 
If the elasticity of substitution is greater than a critical threshold (less than unity), the 
share of life-cycle wealth increasesi but if the elasticity of substitution is very small, it can 
decrease because of tax shifting.129 
Now, however, the effect on relative consumption (wellbeing) is more ambiguous. In 
particular, at rc=o, using (3.11) 
dYw = dw dk' +r(k')(k' -k'") =-kw• f'(k') < 0. 
drc dk* drc 
(C.4) 
On the other hand, since r (k*) =f1<k*) (1 ~ c) I ~ =-'-,. Workers1 lifetime utility 
SP r dr 1 ~r 
if a function of their income and the return to capital: V(r(k), 'fW)1 where Vis the indirect 
utility function. 13° Hence13t at rc=O, 
dV = av [k" f'(k') + (-k'" f'(k')] = 0 dr' ayw . (C.5) 
That is
1 
the loss in income is precisely offset by the increased return to capital. But for 
rc=o, the interest rate effect is larger, and initially the transfers are larger, and workers' 
'3: 
utility is increased, even though wages are lower. But as -cc increases, eventually k* 
falls below k*w: the economy switches to a one class economy, with only life cycle 
savings, with 
k" 
s(kw* )w(kw*) = --. 
I+n 
Clearly, because wages are lower than they were in the initial equilibrium and there 
are no transfers, workers' incomes are lower. There exists an optimal inheritance tax 
re*, O<i-C* <1.132 
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we note below, often consists significantly of what can be referred to as rents) has 
slid from just under 80 percent to around 60 percent. See Giovannoni (2015). 
7. See Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014). :For the UK1 Germany1 and France, 
the wealth-income ratio rose from about 300-360 percent in 1970 to 377-618 
percent in 2010. The US had a relatively small increase1 from 399 percent to 456 
percent. 
8. Kuznets (1955). 
9. Piketty also says that, among those who hold wealth, 11the distribution of wealth 
tends toward a long-run equilibrium and that the equilibrium level of inequality is 
an increasing function of the gap r-g between the rate of return on capital and the 
growth rate ... The greater the difference r-g, the more powerful the divergent force. 
If the demographic and economic shocks take a multiplicative form (i.e., the greater 
the initial capital, the greater the effect of a good or bad investment), the long-run 
equilibriu1n distribution is a Pareto distribution (a mathematical form based on a 
power law, which corresponds fairly well to distributions observed in practice). One 
can also show fairly easily that the coefficient of the Pareto distribution (which 
measures the degree of inequality) is a steeply increasing function of the difference 
r-g." (Piketty, 2014, pp. 363-4). We examine these hypotheses in Stiglitz (2015b), 
showing that the qualitative propositions are not1 in general, valid. 
10. Roberts (2014). It appears that Piketty's analysis seems to have overestimated 11r'1, 
overestimated the extent to which returns were reinvested, and underestimated the 
importance of the division of wealth among one's heirs. 
11. Piketty hilnself recognizes the possibility that there can be an increase in the value 
of land, but quickly dismisses its historical importance (though he notes that does 
not mean that its importance might rise in the future):" ... the increase in the value 
of pure land does not seem to explain much of the historical rebound of the capital/ 
income ratio (sic)" (p. 198). 
12. Included in the increase in the value of land is the value of artificially created scar~ 
city, e.g. through zoning requirements. Land rents are likely to go up significantly 
with increasing urban agglomerations-it is not, as Piketty (2014) seems to suggest, 
that rents some places go up1 and others go down. For instance, in a simple model 
of the city, Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) show that land rents go up with aggregate 
transport costs. Not surprisingly, the importance of agglomerations increases -with 
the size of local public goods. (In their Wghly idealized model, they obtain the result 
that with cities of optimal size, differential land rents are equal to the expenditures 
on local public goods, and are one half the value of aggregate transport costs.) 
13. A result that is consistent with the findings of Galbraith (2012). 
14. See1 for example, Stiglitz (1966, 1969). 
15. At least for some countries, there appears to be an increase in inherited inequality 
relative to life cycle inequality Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Piketty (2014). But 
there is not unanimity about this conclusion. See, in particular, for the US, Wolff 
and Gittleman (2011). Our model enables us to ascertain the conditions under which 
either result might be expected. 
16. As we shall note below, what really matters is the grovvth of the effective labor force, 
the sum of the labor force growth rate and the rate of labor augmenting change. 
17. It is worth noting that in standard models, the condition r"?.g must be satisfied if 
the economy is intertemporally efficient. If Piketty's analysis were correct, it would 
imply that, except in the limiting case where r=g, any efficient economy would be 
characterized by ever increasing inequality. 
It is also worth noting that in the special parameterization so loved by macro-
economists, the Cobb-Douglas production function, average and marginal returns 
move in tandem, so that a fall in the average productivity of capital would be 
accompanied by an equiproportionate fall in the marginal productivity. In the case 
of an elasticity of substitution less than unity, the fall in the marginal productivity 
is larger. (See the discussion below.) 
18. More precisely, as we will explain below, in the effective-capital labor ratio, taking 
into account the increased productivity of each worker. 
19. There are still other anomalies about which we will have only a little to say in this 
paper. Globalization was supposed to increase societal welfare for all countries; even 
if there were distributional effects within countries, the gainers could more than 
compensate the losers. There is increasing evidence that there are indeed losers 
(Acemoglu et al., 2014); but the losers are being told that they must accept further 
cutbacks in wages and government services in order for the country to compete, seem-
ingly suggesting that globalization requires them to accept a lower standard of 
living. 
20. See Arrow et al. (1961); Young (2013). It should be noted that some authors have 
recently argued otherwise. See, for example, Mallick (2007). 
21. The net private savings rate for the US over the period 1970-2010 has been 7.7 per-
cent (Piketty and Zucman1 2014). As they point out, most of the variability in wealth 
income ratios (at least as conventionally measured) can be attributed to the private 
sector. 
22. This can be expressed in another way. The average annual increase in the capital 
stock for the US they estimate to be 3.0 percent, of which the average 11real 11 savings 
accounts (by the calculation above) to about 1.5 percent, or just half. (Piketty and 
Zucman (2014) suggest that savings accounts for 72 percent of the increase in the 
wealth-income ratio.) 
23. We obtain similar results if we postulate particular behavioral models. Take a sim-
plified version of the model that seems to underlay Piketty1s analysis, a Kaldorian 
savings model (Kaldor, 1957), where capitalists save a fraction sP of their income 
and workers nothing. Piketty (2014) implicitly seems to assume sp=l, but the over-
whelming evidence is that even the very rich save a much smaller fraction of their 
income than that. Saez and Zucman (2014) estimate that the average saving rate for 
the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans was 36 percent from 1986 to 2012. Similarly, 
Dynan et al. (2004) obtain high savings rates for the rich - but far lower than unity. 
For simplicity, assume the a~er-tax rate of return on capital (it should be obvious that 
what matters is after tax returns) is 5 percent, Sp= .4. Then capital would increase at 
the rate of .05x.4=.02. If the growth rate were greater than 2 percent, the private 
capital-output ratio would be declining. Note that if the share of capital is around .2, 
this generates a national savings rate of 8 percent, just slightly higher than the actual 
private savings rate. 
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Similar results hold if there are some savings out of wages. As Pasinetti (1962) 
notes, a 1nore reasonable model divides income according to whom it accrues, i.e. 
interest and wage income accruing to workers is treated similarly. In Part III of this 
paper, we assume workers save for their retirement, while capitalists save to pass on 
money to their heirs. In Part III, we sketch a model in which the division of society 
into these different groups arises endogenously. 
24. It is obvious, of course, that the short run fluctuations in the wealth-income ratio 
are dominated by capital gains and by cyclical movements in income. The m<i-rked 
changes in the wealth-income ratio in the US before and after 2008 highlight these 
points. 
25. In the Kaldorian model, the long-run capital-output ratio is given by srSK/g*, where 
SK is the share of capital. 
26. For instance, between 1960 and 2000, the savings rate fell from 8 percent to 2 per-
cent while the rate of growth increased from 2.3 percent to 4.1 percent. If these were 
permanent changes, then the long run capital-output ratio would have fallen by a 
factor of almost 8. (Actually observed growth rates will be higher than g* - the sum 
of the rate of growth of population and labor augmenting technological progress - if 
there has been capital deepening, less than g* if the reverse has been happening. 
27. Matters are no better if we view the savings rate as endogenous, determined by 
intertemporal utility maximization. Then, the critical variable is the intertemporal 
discount rate, and again, it is hard to see changes in that variable of the magnitude 
that •vould account for changes in the observed capital-output ratio. 
28. For wage data see Shierholz and Mishel (2013). 
29. That is, Giovannoni (2014) noted that between 1980 and 1990 the share of the bot-
tom 99 percent of workers has gone down by over 20 percent, which means that 
the ratio of their average wage to their average productivity has gone down by the 
same amount. More dramatic results are observed if we look at broad categories of · 
workers like production and non-supervisory workers1 where (real) wages have stag-
nated over the past forty years, while average productivity has doubled. Note that 
with the Cobb-Douglas production function much beloved by macro~economists1 
marginal and average productivities move perfectly together. Note too that skill-
biased technological change might explain why there might be marked disparities in 
movements in median wages and average productivity; but it does not explain the 
phenomenon just described. 
30. The first to propose the idea of skill-biased technological change was GriUc;hes 
(1969). See also Krusell et al. (2000), Autor (2002); and Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008). 
31. See Card and DiNardo (2002) and Shierholz, Mishel, and Schmitt (2013) and the 
references cited there. 
32. Interpretations of Piketty's work, which confuse the increase of 11wealth11 with an 
increase in capital argue that there must be an elasticity of substitution greater than 
unity - how else could one explain the rising share of capital. But if the elasticity 
of substitution is greater than unity, then labor augmenting technological change 
would lead to an increase in wages at a fixed capital stock, and an even larger 
increase in wages were the capital stock to increase. (The elasticity of substitution has 
to be substantially below unity for the wage to decrease. If there are different kinds 
of labor, similar results hold for the average wage.) 
33. Labor augmenting technological change leads to a higher return to capital, and the 
presumption is that it would lead to higher investment. This would lead to a still 
higher wage. 
34. For simplicity, assume that only the productivity of skilled workers (denoted 
with subscript 1) increased. Let A=the productivity of a skilled worker. If dFK = o 
dt ' 
dK dlog(!") " " " dw dK FKKJt+F1,KAL1 ~=0, and normahz1ng Lat unity, dt=(F1,KAL1 +F2 ,KL2 )dt 
+(R AL + F L ).IL, d/og(A) + RL ;\ dlog( ;\) Using the properties of constant returns 
1,1 1 2,12 dt 11 dt. 
to scale production functions and the condition that FK is unchanged, we can show 
that dw =FL;\ d/og(.l) > O" 
dt 1 l dt 
35. The analysis of capital-augmenting technological progress is somewhat more compli-
cated. First, the 1'volume" measure of the capital stock discussed below is supposed to 
adjust for differences in quality of capital. Whether it does so adequately is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Secondly, with capital augmenting technological progress, 
there is no steady state. Sho1t-term capital augmenting progress, by increasing the 
effective capital stock, would have been expected to have an unambiguously positive 
effect on wages. 
36. These problems are similar to those that have arisen in the measurement of poverty, 
with Pogge and Reddy (2010) arguing that standard estimates do not adequately 
reflect differences in prices faced by the poor - a clai.m that Martin Ravallon has 
disputed1 illustrating that these index number problems are both difficult and 
contentious. 
See, in particular, the discussion of positional goods later in this paper. 
37. I am very indebted to Paul Schreyer of the OECD, who concludes his discussion of 
these issues (personal note to author) by observing "the distinction between the 
wealth and production aspects of capital is indeed important and a story about 1W' 
does not immediately translate into a story about 'K'. Associated with the two per~ 
spectives are different measures that evolve quite differently. However, the key aspect 
in the analysis of capital in production and its link to income shares seems to be the 
treatment of non-produced assets, in particular land. 11 
38. As we noted earlier, although land is not very important in most industrial processes 
(certainly not as important as it is in agriculture), housing services represent an 
important component of GDP, and land is an important input into real estate. 
39. We note that this is not a plausible production function, since if that were the case, 
there shouldn't be any changes in the relative price of T and K1 since they are perfect 
substitutes. 
40. Similar results hold for the two other countries for which we have been able to 
obtain comparable data, Australia and Korea, from the OECD. Land accounts for a 
large part of national wealth - at current prices, between 40 and 60 percent - and the 
wealth-output ratio excluding land has been rising, while the ratio including land 
has been falling. I arn indebted to Paul Schreyer for these data. 
41. See Stiglitz (2003, 2010a) and the references cited there. 
42. Indeed as Giovannoni (2014) points out, simply excluding the top 1 percent of wage 
earners results in a very large decline of the wage share between the period from 
around 1980 to 2009, from slightly more than 75 percent to around 60 percent. 
43. Some question the magnitude of some of the increase in inequality, say the share of 
income at the top for the US, because of changes in the tax law in 1986 which may 
have led to a change in reported income, not actual incomes earned. (Feldstein, 2014) 
We should note that the studies of inequality looking at the increased inequality at 
the top have attempted to deal vvith this obvious problem. (Piketty and Saez, 2003). 
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But the pattern of increased inequality (an increased share of total income going 
to the top 1 percent) continued even after tax changes were partially reversed in 
1993. Moreover, other countries without corresponding changes in tax codes have 
seen similar increases in inequality. (Interestingly, because in the US, the top is the 
only part of distribution that has done very well, if it were the case that most of 
their seeming increase in income is just a change in reporting, it would imply that 
that the overall performance of economy has been really dismal; one would have to 
explain how it is that, given all of the increase in wealth, all of the 11improvements11 
in economic policy, and all of the alleged gains from globalization and technology, 
all of these together seem to have generated so little improvement in standards of 
living to any group in our society, not even, allegedly, the very top.) 
It is, of course, plausible that the overall level of inequality at the top is greater 
than that reported. Administrative data show reported (realized) capital gains, but 
the tax system provides strong incentives for those at the top not to realize their 
capital gains. 
44. In the short run, there can be capital gains on producible assets as well, but such 
increases cannot be sustained in the long run, since they will elicit a supply response. 
Some of the increase in "seeming)/ wealth that occurred in the US prior to the 2008 
crisis may have been attributable to capital gains on buildings (though it is difficult 
to parse out such capital gains from capital gains on land). But the "correction" 
brought down the implied price of building to or below the reproduction cost. If we 
take consumption goods as our numeraire1 the price of capital goods could increase 
or decrease, though such changes typically are of a limited magnitude in the absence 
of technological change; with technological change, there can, of course, be signifi-
cant changes in appropriately measured prices. 
45. Itself an endogenous variable. Changes in preferences and technology can lead to 
increased agglomerations, with an increase in land values. 
46. See Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2014, 2015). 
47. Hotelling (1931) showed that if the cost of extraction of a depletable natural resource 
were zero, its price would rise at the rate of interest (which in an efficient equilibrium 
is always greater than or equal to the rate of growth.) 
48. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) provide an interesting empilical test, pointing 
out that increases in tax rates at the very top are not associated with slower rates 
of growth. See Stiglitz (2012a, 2014b) for a broader discussion, including the many 
forms that rentMseeking takes in a modern economy1 and other evidence that rents 
have become an important source of income at the very top. 
49. The timing of increases in the share of capital are perhaps more consistent with 
those being explained by rapid changes in the degree of exploitation than by sud-
den changes in the effective capital labor ratio. Similarly, it is hard to reconcile the 
enormous divergence between average compensation and productivity of workers 
without assuming an increase in market power. (See Giovannoni, 2014.) 
SO. Assume, for instance, that W /Y = 4. Assume the increase in rents are capitalized in 
the stock market. Then !1W = .OSY/.015 1 so ifY is unchanged, 110/V/Y) = 3.33, so now 
W /Y = 7 .333. Actually, the increase in the wealth-income ratio is even greater than 
these calculations would suggest, since, as we note in the next paragraph, the distor-
tion in the economy lowers the magnitude of the denominator. 
51. See, for instance, Federal Reserve Board (2015) for a discussion of the cost to consum-
ers of predatory lending practices. 
52. Indeed, the extensive research on efficient markets has questioned the value-added 
of the wealth management services of the financial sector: ordinary investors would 
have done as well or better simply by buying indexed funds. 
53. Stiglitz (2012a) outlines many other forms of rent seeking. Some forms of rent-
seeking may detract from measured wealth. If CEOs are able and willing to take 
greater advantage of deficiencies in corporate governance laws to appropriate for 
themselves more of the value of corporations, that should lead to a decrease in the 
market value of firms. There is, however, considerable evidence that because of the 
lack of transparency of the manner in which they appropriate these returns, markets 
typically do not fully reflect the dilution in shareholder value. Moreover, much 
of the compensation takes the form simply of a transfer of ownership claims on 
the returns to the firm. Note further that if this rent appropriation by managers is 
labeled as 11 compensation/' then the wage share is increased. This is consistent with 
the results noted earlier suggesting a marked decline in the wage share if the upper 
one percent of "wage earners" are excluded. 
54. This discussion raises similar issues as those the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress discussed in moving economic activities 
from the public to the private sector (see Stiglitz et al., 2010). 
55. See, for example, Stigltiz (1975). 
56. See1 for instance, Henry and Stiglitz (2010) and the works cited there. 
5 7. As we note below, such changes are often accompanied by a loss in wellbeing of 
others: they must now make royalty payments to the owner of this intellectual 
property. But the diminution of their wellbeing is not necessarily reflected sym~ 
mehically in the wealth accounts. Moreover, the charges imposed for the use 
of knowledge lower GDP, and thus a change in the intellectual property regime 
extending rights to enclose the knowledge commons can both increase the meas-
ured value of wealth and lower the value of GDP: the wealth-income ratio will 
accordingly rise. 
The privatization of public knowledge or the granting of 11excessive11 intellectual 
property (patents that are excessively broad, such as covering all four~wheeled 
self~propelled vehicles, or copyrights that are excessively long, such as extending 
70 years beyond the death of the writer) can be viewed as a special case of the 
exploitation rents discussed above. 
There is one more form of rents associated with intellectual property that has 
almost surely grown over time: that generated by brand names, especially the 
identification of a product with say a sports star). 
58. See Sraffa (1960) and Stiglitz (1974). Thus, in models with the production of com-
modities by means of commodities, the economy at a low interest rate and a high 
interest rate may look the same (the same technologies are employed), while at an 
intermediate interest rate a different technology is employed. Even if the value of 
wealth has changed in going from the low to the high interest rate, there has not 
been capital deepening, at least in any meaningful real sense. There are a variety 
of other reasons that there can be changes in intertemporal pricing, with large 
consequences to the valuation of assets. See the discussion below. 
59. While financial markets often claim that their innovations have enhanced the abil~ 
ity to manage risk, the extent to which this is the case remains debated. Some of the 
financial innovations may have actually increased risk (Stiglitz, 2010b). Some of the 
financial innovations may have led to the creation of pseudo~wealth - wealth based 
simply on differences in perceptions in beliefs (Guzman and Stiglitz (2014)); while 
other innovations, like improvements in the ability to sell short, may reduce market 
values (Scheinkrnan and Xiong, 2003). Part IV of this paper will show how changes 
in financial market regulations can affect the value of assets. 
60. See Milevsky and Huang (2011). For statistics on the size of pension funds, see OECD 
(2013). 
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61. In that sense1 the model is similar to that of Pasinetti (1962), where there are tv.ro 
classes too. We model workers' saving (life cycle savings). 
62. SP can be derived endogenously, if, as in the standard representative agent model, 
families maximize dynastic utility. 
63. Notice that for capitalists, savings are defined as the addition to their wealth1 while 
for workers, since each worker starts life (in this model) with no wealth, savings 
are their total wealth. (There are alternative formulations based on gross savings 
generating similar results.) 
64. We could have employed a more general savings function: S(ku kr+i) where the sav-
ings rate depends not only on the rate of return on capital (which depends on kt+i) 
but also on wages, which depend on kt. It should be apparent that in the steady state, 
savings is just a function of k. Little here depends on the precise form of s, though 
we will observe that some results do depend on whether savings increase or decrease 
with kt> Note that an increase ink will be associated with an increase in wages and 
a decrease in interest rates. swill increase with k so long as the substitution effect of 
the decreased wages is not too large. 
65. As Stiglitz (2010b) shows, there can in general be an infinite number of trajectories 
consistent with rational expectations. This follows from the fact that there may be 
more than one solution to (3.1) and (3.2) and (3.3) for k;~ 1 for any kt. (Substituting 
(3.1) into (3.2), we obtain k;;, =s(k;;, +B(l+s,f'(k,))k;/(l+n))w(k,)). The reason 
is that if workers expect a high interest rate, they will need to save little for their 
retirement - but then the interest rate will be high; but if they expect a low interest 
rate, they will need to save a lot, but then the interest rate will be low. 
66. If workers' intertemporal utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, then s1 =0. If workers' 
utility function is such that U =min {Cv Ct+1}, then (1-s)w=s(l +r)w1 or s= 1/[2+r}, so 
(3.7) can be rewritten ~ = n--1- 1- Sk . An increase in sP reduces the share of 
k* 2sp+n sk 
inherited wealth provided the elasticity of substitution is not too small. 
67. As we have noted earlier, there are a number of other factors that could affect life 
cycle savings - the adequacy of provision of health care for old age1 the efficiency 
of annuity markets and the extent to which they are affected by asymmetries of 
information
1 
and uncertainties both about retirement age, rates of return to capi-
tal, and life expectancies. In practice, there are other institutional factors: most 
individuals save through retirement programs, and the rules and regulations con-
cerning those retirement programs can have first order effects on the amount set 
aside. 
68. The critical condition is that s(k*)w(k*)<k*, or that s(k*) < __ S_, -. If n=l, Sk=0.2 1 
then the condition becomes s(k*)<0.2Ssr sP n(l-Sk) 
69. We should emphasize that this result is not general. In Part IV of this paper, we 
consider
1 
for instance, a model in which capitalists have a choice of assets to hold1 
and in equilibrium, they hold all of the risky assets. In a generalization of that 
model, it is easy to show that a tax on the excess returns to capital over the safe 
interest rate leads to more risk taking, i.e. a shift in their portfolio to higher return 
assets (Damar and Musgrave1 1944; Stiglitz, 1969b). If these assets are complements 
to labor
1 
that shift by itself may increase wages. We note later too that taxes on 
capital gains in land may redirect investment into forms that are more comple-
mentary with labor. 
?O. From (3.4a) f"(k)k dlog(k) =~ dlog(r') f'(k) dt 1-T' dt 
71. Since s is fixed, and yw falls, kw* falls, while k* increases. We can rewrite (3. 7) with 
k'~ s(k•) (1 -S J taxes as -.- = n c __ k +re where Skis the share of capital before tax. 
k s,(1-r) S, 
72, If the government invested only a fraction z of its revenues, then if z is small enough 
(<Spr(l-r';:;;;z*), there is an equilibrium ratio of KP given by sP(l--rc)- z . where Kg is 
KK 7:"Z 
the capital stock owned by the government, KP is that of the private sector. For z<z*, 
k = f'-1 [ n )· For a fixed re, changes in z have no effect on the wages received 
s,(1-r') 
by workers. The payments from the government (per worker) are (1-z)r(k-(1-r')kp). 
We already noted that at the limiting case where z=O, workers are worse off than 
they would be without taxation. 
73. That is, the equilibrium is described by the solution to the pair of equations (in the 
natural notation): 
(i) (1-r')s,r; ~n 
'f, k p ("J'"'r, n -k-+ k, =n 
' 74. An earlier version of the ideas in this section were delivered as a keynote address at 
the National Tax Association annual meetings, Santa Fe1 November, 2014. 
75. See Stiglitz (2015). 
76. This is particularly relevant given the literature which has suggested that the pure 
returns to capital should be taxed at a zero rate, based on a misinterpretation of the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) result. See also Stiglitz (2015). 
77. We cited evidence that that was the case earlier. 
78. This particular formulation has the characteristic of a jump in the level of sav-
ings. A formulation with similar consequences is s(W)=s0 for WS.W1; s(W)W= 
s0W1 +s1(W-W1) for W1S.WS.W2; and s(W)W=s0W1+s1(W2 -W1)+s2(W-W2) for 
W'2:W21 with s1 >>s0 and s1 >>S2• 
79. In Stiglitz (2015b), we also suggest that that model also could not adequately explain 
the growth of wealth inequality that has been observed. 
80. We also noted in Part I that there has been an increase in other forms of rents, and 






This results should be contrasted with that of Part III of this paper. The differ-
ence arises from the difference in the determinants of savings. We believe that the 
assumptions made here provide a better description of today's economy. 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1978) and Stiglitz (2015c) have precisely calculated urban land 
values for cities of different geometries, relating it to aggregate transport costs and 
spending on local public goods. 
The value of land is (1- t1') fi., . The reduction in fk will normally partially offset the 
f, 
tax, so that the value of land will not go down commensurately with the reduction 
in 1-t'. 
For a more complete analysis of this model, see Stiglitz (2010b). Similar results hold 
with money, rather than land, as we show in the Part IV of this paper. 
The other interesting case is that where land as an unproductive store of value. 
If n=O and sp= 1, then in steady state, the interest rate will be zero, and the price 
of land will be constant. (4.6) takes on the form 
(4.9) 
















It should be clear that k* in combination with any value of q is an equilibrium: as 
before, the value of land is indeterminate. 
On the other hand, if sp<l, the analysis of the steady state presents some prob-
lems. Assume that there were a steady state. r* will be positive, and that means 
that the price of land has to be ever increasing - but that in turn would imply that 
wealth is increasing and capital is an increasingly diminishing fraction of wealth. 
And who would hold this ever increasing wealth? 
The only value of q0 consistent with the equilibrium conditions is q=O. If q were 
ever to be positive, for the capital arbitrage equation to be satisfied, an increasing frac-
tion of savings has to be devoted to holding land, and a diminishing amount goes 
into capital accumulation. The rate of interest would, accordingly, rise. But as that 
happens, capital gains increase even more, diverting even more savings into land. 
In short, as before, the equilibrium (with q=O) is not stable. 
If R is the rent from the land, and r is the real interest rate, then the value of land 
Vy=R/r, so that there is an equiproportionate increase in the value of land from a 
decrease in the real interest rate. 
This analysis applies to a comparison across steady states with different K. 
p=M(W,p,u), and, assuming that expectations about capital gains are fixed, 
~~ = :;i_ = 1 _~~~MP · A nahtral stability condition ensutes that the denominator 
is positive. Since Mu<O, the tax reduces the price of land. 
But there are important effects going the other way, and which almost surely 
predominate - for instance, the increased insecurity that the non-rich face, not 
adequately reflected in income statistics. 
The increase in the ptice of land is only pattially explained by the discussion of 
this section. Section 4 argues that the expansion of the credit supply provides an 
important part of the explanation. 
The recurrence of bubbles has been noted by Kindleberger (1978). 
Hahn (1966), Shell and Stiglitz (1967). 
For simplicity, we assume that FK approaches infinity as K approaches zero1 and that 
the marginal product of capital falls to zero only as K approaches infinity. 
In the Kaldor model, r=n/s where here, s is the savings rate of capitalists; in the 
Solow model, where everyone has the same rate, r<f/k=n/s=O. Similar results 
obtain in the two-class model of Part III of this paper. 
See, e.g. Stiglitz (2014) and the references cited there. 
Similar results hold for a model with money, such as that formulated in 
section 4. 
Similar results can be obtained if we assume savings are a fixed fraction of overall 
income (including capital gains). 
If sp>O, there is a unique solution to (7.4a) and (7.8). 
The dynamics are oscillatory if (sK(K*,p*,O)-p*FKK(K*)) 2 <4(-sp(K*1p*,O)p*FKK(K*)). 
dpl SK-pF""(l-s,) 
Note that dK ~~o = sP + (FK _ µ )s3 · If as K gets small, sP remains greater than 
"' (l-s 3)(FK-µ), then the ~~1!!£~o locus will hit the vertical axis. (s3 is the (marginal) 
• 
savings out of capital gains. It is natural to assume that 0<s3<1. 
Alonganytrajecto1y1 dKdp - ddpK//ddt p(FK -µ) whichgoestozeroaspgoestozero. t s-p(Fx-µ) 
101. The steady state can also be described by the intersection of (7.13) and the locus 
sf(k*)- nk* * 
(1-s)n -q · 
which gives the values of k and q such that dk/dt=O when_!!._(log p) = n. dt 
102. A sufficient condition for this is that land and capital are complements. 
103. If there is more than one solution, k** is defined as the smallest. 
104. When the price is too low, eventually, the price may shrink to zero. For the rest of 
the analysis, we ignore this case. 
105. The sign depends on whether for the dk/dt=O locus1 B(l ~ktcg), conditional on fixed 
q, is greater than for the dq/dt=O locus, i.e. whether at q*, (1-s)(frk-q'fl<k) is greater 
or less than sf1(k*)-n. Either seems possible. 
106. The model is obviously stylized, but there are good reasons why land should serve 
better as collateral than capital goods - capital goods tend to be constructed for 
specific purposes, and are less malleable, less alterable to other uses, with often 
large asymmetries of information concerning the prospects of returns not only 
in the intended use, but also in alternative uses. There are other reasons that the 
provision of credit typically gets reflected in land bubbles (or bubbles in other 
fixed assets): when the price of capital goods exceeds the production costs, the 
supply will increase, and this limits the extent to which the price can rise or the 
duration of any bubble associated with a produced good. (Nonetheless, bubbles of 
produced goods do occur - the tech bubble in the nineties and the tulip bubble in 
the seventeenth century being the n1ost famous instances.) 
The model can easily be generalized. We have assumed, in particular, that capi-
talists-entrepreneurs are the only ones who do real savings, while landowners/rent-
iers simply buy land, and that credit is only provided to the latter rather than the 
former. In the final subsection1 we allow credit against capital goods as collateral. 
107. For simplicity, here we assume that sP is the gross savings rate, which is assumed to 
be fixed and based on gross income, where r is now the gross return to capital. We 
could rewrite all of these equations based on net savings and net income, without 
changing any of the results. 
108. Because we do not want to address issues involving the banking system and the 
wealth of its owners1 we will simplify the analysis and assume that it is government 
owned. As formulated, the banking system makes neither profits nor losses. 
109. In Part I of this paper, we noted that this characterized several countlies. 
110. This analysis, however, does not explain why workers' compensation should have 
decreased even as average productivity has increased. Of course, average produc-
tivity could have increased even if the ratio of capital per effective labor unit 
decreased, simply because of technological change. 
111. In the analysis below, Vl'e assume that the rate charged is zero. This is a simplifying 
assumption. All that is required is that the rate charged by less than FK. 
112. This assumes, of course1 that the change in policy was not anticipated. 
113. This can be seen most transparently in a situation where the economy is initially 
at full employment. Assume that savings (consumption) is interest insensitive. 
If financial regulations were eased, so that banks could lend more, given their 
deposits and net worth (reserve and capital adequacy requirements were loosened), 
it would appear that banks could lend more, and if banking is profitable at the 
margin, each bank would believe such a policy would be desirable. But if they all 














started to lend more1 there would be excess demand1 and the Fed would have to 
raise interest rates, to tighten credit in a fully offsetting way. 
We again assume a constant labor supply and normalize the labor supply at unity. 
With all of profits going into (gross) investment, aggregate consumption must 
equal wages. Second period consumption is just B+rgB, that is1 C1+C2=(1-s) 
(w-T)+T+B=w-s(w-T)+B=w1 from which the result follows immediately. 
Recall that capitalists' savings behavior determines r: spr=n. In the remainder of 
this section, we assume sp= 1. 
dlogT sr I 
T=r*B=sr w/(1 +sr ). -- = 1---'- = --> 0. 
g 8 dlogr8 1+srg l+srg 
Cz =(l+rx)B=(I+rg)~.dlogc2 =l- s1~ rs(l+srs-s-sr) rs(l-s) >O. 
1 +srs dlogrs 1+rs l+srs (l+rg)(l+srg) (l+rg)(1+sr:~) 
Steady.state utility of workers is maximized at U(C11w-C1), i.e. where U1=U2• 
Individuals will choose this allocation if r=O. One could conduct a full dynamic 
analysis, rather than focusing on steady states, with much the same results. 
Focusing on steady states greatly simplifies the calculations. 
If we had expanded the model to include land (as in earlier sections) 1 there will also 
be an increase in its value. 
In our model1 the rate of growth of the labor force is zero1 and the rate of labor 
augmenting technical progress is zero. Thus, the long run rate of growth of the 
economy is zero. The critical condition involves the relationship between the rate 
of interest and the rate of gruwth. 
Standard focuses on the zero lower bound constraint. This is a lower bound on 
the nominal interest rate. In the United States, in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
real interest rate has been negative. 
---- ------ ---werec1s eeas1 o dlog(sw/K) [-K'FKK 1)dlog(K) _(s, 1)dlog(K) h . th 1 t"dty f 
dlog(r,) f -KP, dlog(r,) e dlog(r,) 
substitution and SK is the share of capital. We note that because we have normalized 
labor supply at unity, which is fixed, the capital-labor ratio, usually denoted by k, 
is the same as the level of capital stock, K (The elasticity of substitution is equal to 
F,(F-KFK)/KFKFJ'). 
For a discussion of the merits of income contingent loans1 see Chapman et al 2014. 
We note that we are able to derive a simple formula describing tail inequality. In 
the case of a Solow model (all save the same fraction s of their income) with all 
receiving the same wage but stochastic returns to capital, the Pareto coefficient is 
given by 2s2 \- ~2 1 where ii2 is the variance of returns. In the limiting case where Skna 
variance is zero, we obtain the earlier result of Stiglitz (1969) that there is no 
inequality. Note again that the difference between r and growth plays no role, but 
the share of capital does. 
We show that increases in credit available (decreases in collateral requirements) 
can give rise to increases in land values1 but we have also shown that there can be 
land bubbles even in the absence of credit expansion (though recent bubbles have 
dearly been supported by such credit expansion.) 
See, for example, Piketty (2014) and Stiglitz (201Zb). Such changes affect both the 
distribution of income and wealth at any mon1ent of time as well as the dynamics 
that describe the evolution of those variables. This paper has taken technology as 
exogenous, but as Braverman and Stiglitz (1989) point out1 technology and techno-







tenancy arrangements in economies with large disparities in land ownership, but 
not otherwise. But the choice of technology at one moment affects the distribution 
of income and wealth and wealth dynamics, and even the nature of technological 
change (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2014). 
The points raised here (and similar points made elsewhere in this paper) are echoed 
in Suresh Naidu1s excellent review of Piketty (2014). 
The result follows immediately upon observing that we can write W(.K)=(F11w+ 
FL
2
(1-co)), and treating Kand OJ as functions of time. 
ns(l-Sk +Tc) . . 
Now k'"* - sk So long as Sp>ns, the direct effect of an increase Ill 
k* - sp(l--r')+s(k*)tcn· 
taxes is to increase the importance of life cycle savings. If the elasticity of substitu-
tion is greater than one, the indirect effect is also positive, so long as s 1 s;O. (Now 
the workers' savings rate plausibly depends on k, since there is no taxation on the 
return to life cycle savings, and the before tax return increases.) 
We can in principle derive the savings functions from V. 




This analysis assumes that social welfare is only assessed from the perspective of 
workers (who receive no inheritances.) It ignores the welfare of the capitalists. If 
their wellbeing were also included within the social welfare function, the optimal 
tax would obviously be different. Note the steady state income of the capitalists 
always decreases with taxation, that is, d~' ((1 -r')rk') ~ (1 -r ')(f'(k') + f"(k')k') 
~:: "r(k')k' n;:s;k) < o, but so does income per capita. 
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